Note: Nochilas Luise wrote Massachusetts Wants the Juice1Alex Altmix, Understanding Juice/Vig in Sports Betting, Bettingpros (Dec. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/F2GR-C4EV (explaining that “[j]uice, or vig, in sports betting, is the cut or amount charged by a sportsbook or bookie for taking a bet from a gambler.”).: Analyzing What Is Holding Back Sports Gambling From Becoming Legal in the Commonwealth during the development of this issue in the Spring of 2020.
Introduction
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the majority of the public has strongly opposed the concept of gambling on sports.2See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S.Ct. 1461, 1468–69 (2018) (holding that the federal sports betting statute preventing any casino outside of Nevada from taking a bet on a sporting event was a violation of the Tenth Amendment). These opponents argue that betting on sports can become incredibly addictive, especially among young citizens, and can even lead to instances of corruption, which has proven to seriously damage the reputation of both professional and amateur sports.3 Id. at 1469–70. From the Chicago White Sox scandal in the 1919 World Series4Ron Grossman, Flashback: How 8 White Sox Players Fell from Grace and Were Forever Marked the Black Sox, Chi. Trib. (Oct. 4, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://perma.cc/MM6V-GDEQ (highlighting the 1919 World Series scandal where eight members of the Chicago White Sox were paid by underground bookies to fix the World Series in exchange for a large sum of money). to the Boston College basketball point shaving scheme, these arguments are not completely without merit.5See David Purdum, ‘The Worst Fix Ever’, ESPN (Oct. 3, 2014), https://perma.cc/SS68-WJH5 (highlighting the 1978 point shaving scandal where several Boston College basketball players were paid by local bookmakers to fix games that they were playing in to ensure that Boston College would not cover the games’ point spread). As a result, for a long time, Nevada was the only state that allowed legal gambling on sports in stand-alone casinos.6See Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1471. However, as time passed, the legality of sports gambling has become seemingly inevitable.7See James Herbert, Adam Silver: Legalized Sports Gambling ‘Inevitable’ in More States , Cbs Sports (Sept. 4, 2014, 6:59 PM ET), https://perma.cc/9VFX-CJ85 The negative stigma behind sports gambling quickly began to diminish, as placing a bet on a sports game started being viewed as another form of entertainment.8Kieran Hair, Clearing Away the Stigma on Sports Betting, Sportsanalytics (Apr. 27, 2015), https://perma.cc/DL2E-JWCK. Further, states began to fully comprehend the potential mammoth profits that legalized sports gambling could bring to their respective state.9See Katherine Sayre, Mobile Sports Betting Is the Moneymaker as More States Legalize, Wall ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2019, 7:03 PM EST), https://perma.cc/8K7M-XZT5
Consequently, in May of 2018, the United States Supreme Court changed sports gambling forever through its ruling in Murphy v. NCAA.10See Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1467–68. The Court lifted the federal ban on sports betting, leaving it up to individual states to implement their own sports betting legislation. 11SeeId. at 1466. Some states acted immediately and passed legislation, while others have lagged behind.12See Ryan Butler, Where Is Sports Betting Legal? Projections for All 50 States, Action Network, https://perma.cc/U5YV-W36K (last updated Feb 4, 2021, 8:00 AM EST) (analyzing where each state currently stands in passing its own sports gambling legislation). Massachusetts, however, is stuck in the middle.13SeeId. In January of 2019, Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker was one of many Massachusetts lawmakers who proposed a bill that would permit Massachusetts to allow some form of legalized sports gambling in the Commonwealth.14Massachusetts Sports Betting, The Lines, https://perma.cc/44ZC-C46H (last visited Mar. 31, 2021). Nonetheless, since that proposal, little progress has been made.15See Id. In the meantime, twenty-two states have passed some form of legislation, with many more on the horizon in 2020.16 See Butler, supra note 12. Through both amending and consolidating its current proposals, Massachusetts can soon follow suit.17See Butler, supra note 12.
Part I of this Note will recount the history of sports gambling in the United States.18See infra Part I. First, it will discuss the evolution of sports gambling laws throughout the country up to the enactment of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (hereinafter “PASPA”) in 1992. 19See infra Part I(A)(1). Next, Part I will discuss the evolution of PASPA from 1992 until its eventual overturn in Murphy v. NCAA.20See infra Part I(A)(2)–(B). Lastly, Part I will explore the legislation that states have passed since the Murphy decision.21See infra Part I(C).
Part II will identify the issue this Note seeks to address—specifically, how Massachusetts can improve the numerous proposed sports gambling bills in order to legalize sports gambling in the Commonwealth as quickly and efficiently as possible.22See infra Part II(A). Subsequently, Part III will argue that Massachusetts should consolidate the various proposed sports gambling bills into a single omnibus bill, based largely on a hybrid of previously passed states’ legislations. 23See infra Part III. It will also argue that the single bill should focus on online wagering, implement an appropriate tax rate for online and retail operators, and incorporate collegiate wagering in order to maximize state revenue.24See infra Part III(B). Particularly, Part III will analyze the appropriate initiation fees for sports gambling in Massachusetts, and model the differentiation between online and retail fees in a similar way as New Jersey recently did.25 See infra Part III(B).
Lastly, this part will examine how sports gambling can further evolve in Massachusetts once legislation is passed.26See infra Part III(C). Specifically, it will discuss the inevitable transformation that the Massachusetts State Lottery must undergo in order toto survive the expansion of legal sports gambling.27See infra Part III.
I. Background
A. History of Sports Gambling in the United States Pre-Murphy Decision
1. Overview of Laws Before the 1992 PASPA EnactmentIn general, sports gambling functions by a gambler betting against the sportsbook, or the casino operator, on a specific game or event.28Hunter M. Haines, Passing the Ball: The United States Supreme Court Strikes Down Paspa and Throws Sports Gambling Back to State Legislatures, 78 Md. L. Rev. 604, 608 (2019). The most common type of bet involves wagering against a point spread.29See generally What is a Point Spread?, The Lines, https://perma.cc/6CFT-6TJ6 (last visited Mar. 31, 2021) (illustrating the need for a point spread in gambling, as it puts both teams on an even playing field by forcing the team that is expected to win to have to win by a certain amount in order for them to cover the spread, and for a bettor wagering on the team to win their bet). This consists of a gambler making a bet against the designated point spread, and to win, the team that the gambler has wagered on must “cover the spread.”30Haines, supra note 28, at 608. For example, if a gambler bets that the New England Patriots will cover the spread against the New York Giants—and the Patriots are a six point favorite to win—the Patriots must win by seven points or more in order for the gambler to cover the spread and win his bet.31See Haines, supra note 28, at 608. The gambler is betting against the sportsbook, or what is commonly known as the “house.”32Haines, supra note 28, at 608. If the Patriots win by exactly six points, then the bet will result in a “push,” meaning that neither the gambler nor the sportsbook wins or loses any money because the game’s final score exactly matched the point spread.33Haines, supra note 28, at 608. If the Giants either lose by fewer than six points, or win, then the sportsbook will win the money that the gambler bet against it.34 Haines, supra note 28, at 608.
At the end of the nineteenth century, gambling was largely banned throughout the United States, but laws eventually began to loosen in the 1920s and 1930s.35Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1468–69 (2018). For example, in 1897, New Jersey instituted a constitutional amendment that barred all gambling throughout the state.36Id. at 1469. However, it eventually allowed gambling on horse races to increase state revenue during the Great Depression, and subsequently allowed churches and other nonprofit organizations to host bingo games in the 1950s.37Id. In 1970, New Jersey became the third state to run a state lottery.38Id.
In 1949, the State of Nevada legalized sports betting.39Brett Smiley, A History of Sports Betting in the United States: Gambling Laws and Outlaws, Sports Handle (Nov. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/9U42-VWX2. Two years later, the federal government imposed an initial 10% tax on all sports bets.40Id. This tax rateproved to be too costly, as many Nevada sportsbooks were operating at a loss and were forced to close.41Id. In 1974, Congress reduced this tax to 2%, which allowed Nevada, and especially Las Vegas, to profit immensely from sports betting and offered another stream of tax revenue for the federal government.42Id.
However, outside of Nevada, organized crime dominated the gambling and sports wagering markets in the mid-twentieth century.43Id. Organized crime members were known to take a percentage off of almost every illegal bookmakers’ profits throughout the United States. 44See Id. In an attempt to combat this phenomenon, Congress, along with United States Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, passed various laws intending to “curb” illegal sports betting.45Smiley, supra note 39. Nevertheless, these laws could only limit illegal sports gambling to a certain extent, and it began to proliferate again in the 1970s and 1980s when the United States Department of Justice decided to de-prioritize the enforcement of anti-gambling laws.46Smiley, supra note 39.
Furthermore, when Atlantic City, New Jersey, was struggling financially in the 1960s, the State felt that casino gambling could potentially revitalize the city.47Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S.Ct. 1461, 1469 (2018). While a 1974 referendum on statewide legalization failed, voters approved a law to allow casino gambling solely in Atlantic City in 1976.48Id. Until that time, Nevada had been the only state with legal casinos.49Id. It remained that way until the passing of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988, which allowed casinos to open on Indian land throughout the country.50Id. Nonetheless, Nevada still remained the only state venue for legal sports gambling in casinos.51Id.
Restricting legal sports gambling to casinos in Nevada for so many years was done for a variety of reasons.52See generally David Porter & Regina Garcia-Cano, Easier Gambling Has Sports Worried about Fighting the Fix, NBC Bay Area (Sept. 18, 2018, 6:13 AM PST), https://perma.cc/3X9H-YRYU. Chief among them was to preserve the sanctity of sports, as there was a belief that legalizing sports gambling would increase the possibility of sporting events being fixed.53See Id. The aforementioned Chicago White Sox and Boston College Basketball scandals are just two examples that validate this notion.54See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 4; Purdum, supra note 5.
However, the greatest example of this perception may be NBA referee Tim Donaghy’s system in which he fixed the outcome of a vast number of NBA games.55 See Scott Eden, How Former Ref Tim Donaghy Conspired to Fix NBA Games, ESPN (July 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/9ZCV-3FTL. Specifically, Donaghy, along with a few friends who were involved in organized crime, set up a system in which they would bet on games that Donaghy was officiating.56Id. Through the use of burner phones, Donaghy would relay inside information to the bookmakers about the playing conditions that night, as well as provide them with which team to bet on in the game that he was officiating.57Id. Donaghy would also wager large amounts on the game himself, as well as receive compensation from the bookmakers for his inside information.58See Id. As the referee, he was allegedly able to manipulate the outcome of the game through the calling of fouls at moments favorable to the team on which he was wagering in a way that was almost impossible to prove.59Id. His tips won at a rate of 88%.60Id. Donaghey refereed over seven hundred and fifty regular season games and twenty playoff games in his career, but it is unknown just how many games Donaghy and his friends employed this system for.61See Donaghy Under Investigation for Betting on NBA Games, ESPN (July 20, 2007), https://perma.cc/TD5C-G3LN The system was eventually exposed, and Donaghy spent fifteen months in federal prison for his participation in the scandal.62Donaghy Sentenced to 15 Months in Prison in Gambling Scandal, ESPN (July 29, 2008), https://perma.cc/XH3G-LWTP
2. The PASPA Enactment and Its Evolution
By the 1990s, there were trends signaling that the legalization of many other forms of gambling may extend to sports gambling as well.63 Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1470 (2018). This sparked opponents to ensure that this did not happen by enacting legislation to stem the tide.64Id. Thus, PASPA was passed in 1992, despite the Department of Justice opposing it.65Id. Initial proponents of PASPA argued that it would protect the younger generations, and one of the bill’s sponsors, Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey—a former college and professional basketball star—argued that the law needed to be passed in order to save the integrity of sports.66Id.
In general, PASPA made it “unlawful” for a State to sponsor or promote any form of gambling on competitive sporting events “pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity.”6728 U.S.C. § 3702 (1992) (“It shall be unlawful for—(1) a governmental entity to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact, or (2) a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity—a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly (through the use of geographical references or otherwise), on one or more competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more performances of such athletes in such games.”); Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1470. However, PASPA did not make sports gambling a federal crime, which alleviated the burden of law enforcement on the federal government.68Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1470; See § 3702. Instead, PASPA allowed the Attorney General, as well as amateur and professional sports organizations, to bring a civil action to enjoin any violation.69Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1470–71; See 28 U.S.C. § 3703 (1992) (“A civil action to enjoin a violation of section 3702 may be commenced in an appropriate district court of the United States by the Attorney General of the United States, or by a professional sports organization or amateur sports organization whose competitive game is alleged to be the basis of such violation.”).
At the time of PASPA’s enactment, there were a few jurisdictions that already allowed sports gambling.70Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1471. As alluded to above, Nevada was the only state to allow sports gambling in casinos.71Id. Additionally, Oregon, Delaware, and Montana legally hosted sports lotteries and sports pools.72Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act – Paspa, Online Gambling Sites, https://perma.cc/JS7F-APCD (last visited Mar. 31, 2021). For example, the Oregon Lottery legally operated a parlay card system, named Sports Action, which began in 1989.73Id. Originally, Sports Action offered only National Football League (hereinafter “NFL”) games, but subsequently allowed National Basketball Association (hereinafter “NBA”) games in 1990.74Id. That lasted only a single season.75Id. The Portland Trail Blazers, the state’s home team, was not offered on the NBA parlay cards, and a lack of sales plus a lawsuit initiated by the NBA prompted Oregon to discontinue NBA parlay cards. 767Id.6 Moreover, the NFL and NCAA were also unhappy with Oregon’s gambling system, and the NFL explicitly stated that the state would never get a team as long as it offered betting on professional football.77Id. The NCAA refused to permit any tournament games from occurring in Oregon as well.78Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act – Paspa, supra note 72. In 2005, a bill was introduced to outlaw Sports Action altogether in Oregon.79Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act – Paspa, supra note 72. It eventually passed, and 2007 was the last season of Sports Action in Oregon.80Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act – Paspa, supra note 72. This prompted NCAA basketball to resume tournament games in the state.81Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act – Paspa, supra note 72.
To incorporate these states that already had some form of sports gambling legislation in place, PASPA also contained a provision that “grandfathered in” these states, allowing them to continue their activities, which would have otherwise now been illegal pursuant to PASPA.82Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1471 (2018); See 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2020) (“Section 3702 shall not apply to a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme in operation in a State or other governmental entity, to the extent that the scheme was conducted by that State or other governmental entity at any time during the period beginning January 1, 1976, and ending August 31, 1990 . . . .”). Additionally, PASPA contained another provision that gave New Jersey the option of legalizing sports gambling in Atlantic City, as long as it did so within one year of PASPA’s effective date.83Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1471. New Jersey did not take advantage of this opportunity, but the State changed its mind in 2011 as sports gambling started to become even more popular.84Id.
In 2011, New Jersey voters approved an amendment to their State Constitution making it lawful for the legislature to authorize sports gambling.85Id. A year later, the legislature enacted a law doing just that.86Id. This 2012 Act was immediately scrutinized, and both the major professional sports leagues and the NCAA quickly brought an action in federal court against the New Jersey Governor and other New Jersey state officials.87Id. The leagues sought to enjoin the new law, alleging that it was a violation of PASPA.88Id. New Jersey argued in response that PASPA was unconstitutional, as it infringed on the State’s sovereign authority to end its sports gambling ban.89Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1471. Particularly, New Jersey cited to two cases in which the Court struck down federal laws based on the “anti-commandeering” principle, which is further explained in Part B of this Note.90Id.; See infra Part I(B). However, in February of 2013, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that PASPA was constitutional and preempted New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law.91Joseph Stiers, Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n: The Court Legalizes Sports Gambling, but Constitutional Questions Remain, 14 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 135, 137 (2018). The Third Circuit later upheld the decision, and New Jersey’s petition for certiorari was denied.92Id. at 137–38.
In response to the Third Circuit’s decision, the New Jersey State Senate enacted an additional bill, which partially repealed the state’s prohibition on sports gambling by allowing sports wagering only at licensed casinos and racetracks.93Id. at 138. New Jersey Governor Christie initially vetoed the bill, but eventually signed it on October 17, 2014, repealing New Jersey’s prohibition on sports wagering.94Id.
B. Murphy v. NCAA Holding and Its Effects
Following the enactment of this law, the NCAA again sued New Jersey alleging that the new 2014 law was once again preempted by PASPA.95Id. Both the District Court and Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the 2014 law was still preempted by PASPA.96Id. at 138–39. Specifically, the Third Circuit ruled that the fact that New Jersey tried to circumvent preemption by repealing the state’s prohibition on sports gambling did not prevent the Court from examining what the provision actually does and also does not change the fact that the 2014 law “selectively grants permission to certain entities to engage in sports gambling.”97Stiers, supra note 91, at 139. New Jersey petitioned for certiorari and the Supreme Court granted it on June 27, 2017.98Stiers, supra note 91, at 139. The Supreme Court consolidated Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n with New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n to resolve the issue of whether PASPA unconstitutionally commandeered the regulatory power of the states by prohibiting the repeal of state law.99Stiers, supra note 91, at 139–40.
In Murphy v. NCAA, the Court struck down the provision of PASPA which mandates that states may not “sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact” sports betting.100Ilya Somin, Federalism Comes Out As the Winner in Murphy v. NCAA, The Regulatory Review 2 (July 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/D5E6-L4FP. The provision was overturned on the basis of a Tenth Amendment violation.101Id. Further, the Court acted on a theory of anti-commandeering, stating that Congress may not commandeer individual state governments to impose and enforce federal law.102Id. Due to the overturn of this provision, individual states are now allowed to implement their own laws on sports betting should they so desire.103Id. at 3.
Specifically, by stressing the importance of the Tenth Amendment and anti-commandeering doctrine, the Court concluded that anti-commandeering is important to prevent tyranny by balancing powers between the national and state governments, encourage political accountability by making Congress accountable for its own regulations, and to “prevent Congress from shifting the cost of regulations to the states.”104Stiers, supra note 91, at 149. PASPA violated the anti-commandeering doctrine by “unequivocally dictat[ing] what a state legislature may and may not do.”105Stiers, supra note 91, at 149.
C. Individual State Legislation Passed post-Murphy
As stated above, the Court’s ruling in Murphy allows states to implement their own sports betting legislation.106Somin, supra note 100, at 2–3. Since the ruling in May of 2018, twenty-two states and Washington D.C. have passed some form of gambling legislation, while three more states are projected to pass some form of legislation in 2020.107Butler, supra note 12 (highlighting the three states that are projected to pass legislation in 2020, and explaining where that legislation currently stands for each state); See Somin, supra note 100, at 3. Of the states that have already passed legislation, each state has its own unique aspects in its respective laws that may attract a prospective gambler for a variety of reasons.108See Butler, supra note 12.
1. Delaware
On June 5, 2018, Delaware became the first state since the Murphy decision to launch casino-style sports gambling in each of the state’s three casinos.109Marc Edelman, Regulating Sports Gambling in the Aftermath of Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 26 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 313, 325–26 (2018). While Delaware allows wagering on both professional and collegiate sports, it does not allow for betting on the sporting events of collegiate teams that reside within the state.110Id. at 326. Further, Delaware does not currently allow for any online sports betting.111Id.
One of the main reasons that Delaware was quick to legalize sports gambling was to raise state revenue, as it is one of five states in the country to not generate revenue through a sales tax. 112Id. Rather than introduce a special tax on sports gambling, the casinos in Delaware operate subject to a “revenue-sharing arrangement.”113Id. Under this arrangement, after a winner is paid and the host provider receives a 12.5% share of revenues, the remainder of the sports-gambling revenue is allocated between the state and the casino operators.114Id. In Delaware, “the State share is 50 percent.”115Edelman, supra note 109, at 326.
2. New Jersey
After Delaware, New Jersey became the second state since Murphy to legalize casino-style sports gambling.116Edelman, supra note 109, at 327. However, New Jersey forbids betting on any “collegiate sport or athletic event that takes place in New Jersey or . . . in which any New Jersey college team participates.”117Edelman, supra note 109, at 327. The New Jersey legislation “also disallows betting on ‘high school sports events, electronic sports, and competitive video games.’”118Edelman, supra note 109, at 327.
New Jersey allows both residents and non-residents to place wagers on their phones, so long as they are within the state’s borders.119See Nick Corasaniti, Move Over, Nevada: New Jersey is the Sports Betting Capital of the Country, N.Y. Times (June 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/9LT2-W7V4. In 2019, New Jersey brought in $4.5 billion in bets, more than 80% of which have come via mobile wagering, and is projected to bring in $5 billion in 2020.120Butler, supra note 12. Further, New Jersey taxes operate at 8.5% for sports bets made in person and 13% for online and mobile sports bets.121Weston Blasi, This State Makes the Most Tax Revenue from Sports Betting—And It’s Not Nevada, Marketwatch (Nov. 23, 2019, 12:29 PM EST), https://perma.cc/5XT5-JDR8 (highlighting that although many more people bet in Nevada than in New Jersey, the latter is generating more tax revenue due to its higher rates). This has resulted in New Jersey challenging Nevada as the “new face of sports betting.”122Id.
3. Michigan
In December of 2019, the State of Michigan passed a bill legalizing sports betting throughout the state.123Matthew Kredell, Sports Betting is Coming to Town: Michigan Governor Signs Bill to Legalize Sportsbooks, Legal Sports Report (Dec. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/RZP9-YZEN The legislation allowed for full mobile wagering within the state and in-person wagering was established at the MGM Grand Detroit in March of 2020.124Butler, supra note 12. Michigan’s sports betting bill taxes wagers at 8.4%, as well as sets the prices for licenses at $100,000.125Zack Jones, Michigan Passes Sports Betting Legislation: The Race To Launch Before March Madness, Forbes (Dec. 22, 2019, 5:38 PM EST), https://perma.cc/C3XN-JDV3. Along with the initial license fee, Michigan also charges a $50,000 application fee and a $50,000 annual operation fee.126Id.
4. New York
In June of 2019, the New York Gaming Commission voted to allow in-person betting in four upstate casinos.127Butler, supra note 12. However, these casinos, Resorts World, Rivers Casino, Tioga Downs, and Del Lago, are located hundreds of miles away from New York City, which makes placing a legal sports bet inconvenient for a large number of New Yorkers.128See Butler, supra note 12. Later in 2019, it looked as if mobile sports betting might also be legalized in New York, as the state Senate passed a bill that included online wagering provisions.129See Butler, supra note 12. However, that bill was shut down within two days over questions of whether legalizing mobile sports betting would require an amendment to New York’s constitution.130Rick Rockwell, New York’s Legislature Squashes Mobile Sports Betting, Gamblingsites.Org (June 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/CYR9-9A8S. Yet, the mobile wagering bill was reintroduced to both the Senate and Assembly in January of 2020 by Senator Joe Addabbo, with hopes of legalizing mobile sports betting in the state at some point in 2020.131See Joseph P. Addabo Jr., While Sports Pause, Addabbo Wants to “Plan, Pass, and Prepare” Mobile Sports Betting Legislation, THE N. Y. STATE S. (May 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/BZZ4-W99V.
5. Illinois
Although Illinois legalized sports betting in June of 2019, the State provided no medium for its residents to wager through until March 9, 2020, when Chicago Blackhawks Announcer Eddie Olczyk placed the state’s first legal wager at River Casino in Des Plaines.132Butler, supra note 12; See Todd Feurer, Illinois Kicks Off Sports Betting; Eddie Olczyk Places First Wager at Rivers Casino Sportsbook, CBS Chi. (Mar. 9, 2020, 2:31 PM), https://perma.cc/Z6KJ-H72H (illustrating that Illinois ended its hiatus of having nowhere for its residents to legally wager when it chose a city icon to wager $100 on the Chicago White Sox to win the American League Pennant). Illinois’ sports betting bill is unique in that it gives its own physical locations, such as casinos, racetracks, and sports venues, an eighteen-month head start in accepting wagers over other online only mediums such as FanDuel and DraftKings.133Butler, supra note 12. Along with these stipulations, bettors will also have to register in-person at the respective location if they choose to wager within those first eighteen months.134Butler, supra note 12. Finally, under the bill, Illinois sports stadiums, such as Wrigley Field and the United Center, are eligible to apply to have betting kiosks at their events.135Butler, supra note 12.
II. The Problem or Issue Being Addressed
A. How Can the Massachusetts Legislature Consolidate the Numerous Bills Related to Sports Wagering in Order to Ensure That the Path to Legalization Is As Quick and Efficient As Possible, While Also Safeguarding Legal Sports Wagering in the State to Allow It to Remain Successful Long-Term?
In February of 2018, the Massachusetts Gaming Commission (hereinafter “MGC”) released a thirty-one page white paper aiming to offer a “roadmap for those seeking to learn about the current landscape of the sports betting discussion in the country and its possibilities in Massachusetts.”136Ryan Rodenberg, United States of Sports Betting: An Updated Map of Where Every State Stands, ESPN (NOV. 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/3QBC-6MSQ. In January of 2018, before the Murphy decision, Senate bill 2273 was introduced in order to mandate the study of sports betting and its effects.137Id. A different bill was then introduced in November of 2018 to legalize and regulate sports betting.138Id. Ultimately, a number of sports betting legalization bills were introduced in January of 2019.139Id.
Specifically, at that time various Massachusetts’ lawmakers, including Governor Charlie Baker, filed more than a dozen sports betting related bills, and it initially looked as if Massachusetts was going to be one of the first states to legalize sports gambling.140Jill R. Dorson, Mass Lawmaker on Legal Sports Betting:‘Why Is This Taking So Long?’, Sportshandle (July 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/82JJ-JBRZ. However, little has changed since January of 2019.141 SeeId. Between Massachusetts’ lawmakers recognizing that “intense study” on the topic is critical to ensure that sports betting is legalized properly and the copious number of bills that have been proposed on the topics, the status of legalizing sports gambling in Massachusetts has become convoluted and stagnant.142Id.
However, passing sports gambling legislation is not as simple as it may seem.143See, e.g., Nik DeCosta-Klipa, Charlie Baker Announces Bill to Legalize Sports Gambling in Massachusetts, Boston.Com (Jan. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/B7PD-C6WU (noting that legislators face issues of ensuring that identity verification systems for online users, as well as regulations to protect the people placing wagers, are in place before legislation can be passed, providing an overall safeguard for the state). Issues remain regarding how expansive to make sports gambling, whether to allow wagering at physical sportsbooks or solely mobile betting, how much to charge companies for licensing fees, what tax rate to charge residents on their winnings, where this vast amount of new state revenue will go, as well as how to ensure that it remains safe for residents.144Id. Thus, the question has become what can be done to quickly and efficiently legalize sports gambling in Massachusetts, while ultimately ensuring that bettors are enticed enough to move from illegal gambling to legal gambling?145See infra Part III.
Analysis
III. The Current Massachusetts Sports Gambling Bill Proposals Should Be Consolidated into an Omnibus Bill Based on Other States’ Legislations, and Be Expanded to Encompass Collegiate Wagering, All While Ensuring That Bettors Will Be Enticed to Move from Illegal to Legal Sports Gambling.
On January 17, 2019, Governor Charlie Baker introduced his bill to implement sports wagering in Massachusetts.146See Dorson, supra note 140. However, as stated above, this bill was not the only one introduced to the state legislature.147Dorson, supra note 140. Over a dozen Massachusetts lawmakers introduced some form of sports gambling legislation around this time.148Dorson, supra note 140. Coupled with the notion that legalizing sports gambling is a very complex and quarrelsome issue, there seldom has been movement since the initial introduction of the bills.149See Dorson, supra note 140. Ultimately, in order for sports gambling legislation to be passed, these bills should be consolidated into an omnibus bill by combining the paramount aspects of each, as well as by implementing provisions from neighboring states’ legislations. 150See, e.g., Colin A. Young, Mass. Policymakers to Draw Boundary on College Sports Betting, WBUR (May 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/ATW2-8TN4 (illustrating various Massachusetts’ lawmakers proposed sports betting legislation, and providing a brief glimpse into the key differences between the respective proposals).
A. Comparative Analysis of Proposed Legislation
Governor Baker’s proposed bill would allow both licensed casinos in Massachusetts, as well as online platforms like DraftKings, to build their own sports betting operations.151State House News Service, Gov. Charlie Baker’s Sports Gambling Bill Excludes College Sports Betting, Masslive (Jan. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/P2XD-XQQ3. A main provision in the bill would only allow gamblers to wager on professional sports, excluding collegiate sports, high school sports, and eSports.152Id. Of all the states that have already passed legislation, no state has a full collegiate sports wagering exclusion, for example New Jersey bans only collegiate wagering if it involves a New Jersey school.153Edelman, supra note 109, at 325–327. Experts believe that Baker’s rationale for this unique proposal is that he is trying to strike a balance between recognizing the potential for a vast amount of additional state revenue, while also attempting to remain conservative by limiting sports wagering solely to professional sports.154Young, supra note 150.
In his bill, Governor Baker also projected that, if passed, the legislation would earn an estimated $35 million in new revenue for local aid in 2020.155State House News Service, supra note 151. Next, Baker’s bill would give the MGC the power to oversee sports betting in the state.156State House News Service, supra note 151. The MGC would have the ability to license applicants, as well as enforce consumer protections, including limiting anyone under twenty-one years old from placing bets.157State House News Service, supra note 151. Further, the existing casinos, such as MGM Springfield, Encore Boston Harbor, and Plainridge, would be eligible to obtain a license to run sports betting lounges in their casinos, as well contract with outside online vendors to implement online betting that is associated with their respective casino.158State House News Service, supra note 151. Separately, platforms that operate strictly online, such as DraftKings, could also apply to the MGC for a license to host sports betting on their platforms.159State House News Service, supra note 151. If passed, the bill would also require the license applicants to pay a $100,000 application fee and a $500,000 license fee, which would need to be renewed every five years.160State House News Service, supra note 151.
Baker’s proposed legislation also calls for an increased tax rate for the profits garnered by the legal operators.161See State House News Service, supra note 151. Profits from in-person wagers would be taxed at 10%, while online betting profits would be taxed at 12.5% as essentially a convenience tax.162State House News Service, supra note 151. Governor Baker also proposed taxing online fantasy sports at 12.5%, as an attempt to “level the playing field” between sports betting and fantasy sports.163State House News Service, supra note 151.
While it is assumed that Governor Baker’s proposed bill will carry a lot of weight in the eventual legislation that gets passed, it is also important to consider other bills that Massachusetts’s lawmakers have put forth, as the additional bills are a key factor in why the legislation has become stagnant.164 See generally An Act Expanding Sports Wagering in the Commonwealth, H.R. 68, 191st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2019); An Act to Regulate Sports Wagering, S. 201, 191st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2019). For instance, Senator Brendan Crighton was among a group that filed a proposed bill on January 16, 2019.165Mass. S. 201 (2019). Crighton’s bill differs from Baker’s bill since it would allow collegiate sports wagering in Massachusetts, but similar to New Jersey, would prohibit bettors from wagering on any game that involves a Massachusetts school.166Young, supra note 150. Crighton testified, in contrast to Baker’s bill, that he believes that it is imperative for Massachusetts’s sports books to take action on college games.167Young, supra note 150. Crighton’s rationale for this largely relates to understanding the need to lure bettors away from the illegal market to the legal market.168Young, supra note 150. He testified stating that there is currently illegal betting occurring throughout the state, and in order to draw residents away from that market, it is necessary to offer a model that includes one of the more popular forms of betting.169Young, supra note 150.
Similar to Baker’s bill, Crighton’s proposed legislation would put the MGC at the forefront of licensing sport betting operators, and the applicants would be limited to current casino licensees, as well as the major mobile platforms.170State House News Service, Lynn Senator Putting Sports Betting Bill on Table, WBJ (Jan. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/F5Q8-4TRS [hereinafter Lynn Senator Puts Sports Betting Bill on Table] However, in further contrast to Baker’s bill, Crighton’s proposal would require existing gaming licensees to pay a $500,000 application fee, while online operators would be required to pay a $1 million application fee.171Id. Crighton’s bill would also require a 12.5% tax to sport betting profits, regardless of whether the bet is made through an in-person casino counter or through a mobile application.172Id. The bill also projects state revenues to be between roughly $50 million and $70 million per year.173Id.
Another lawmaker, Massachusetts State Representative Dan Cullinane proposed his own legislation in January of 2019, which encompasses some stark differences from both Baker’s and Crighton’s proposals.174SeeId.; Young, supra note 150; Meet Dan, Emily, & Our Family, Dan Cullinane State Representative, http://www.dancullinane.com/meet_dan (last visited Mar. 31, 2021). For example, Cullinane’s bill would not allow mobile platforms to take part in sports wagering on their own but would rather force them to contract with a stand-alone physical establishment, such as one of the three major casinos.175State House News Service, supra note 151. Also, his bill would allow sports leagues to collect an integrity fee, totaling one-quarter of 1% on the total handle bet on games in Massachusetts.176 Lynn Senator Putting Sports Betting Bill on Table, supra note 170. This fee is something that neither Baker’s nor Crighton’s bill touches upon at all.177State House News Service, supra note 151.
Lastly, Ipswich Republican Brad Hill has also filed his own bill to legalize sports betting. 178State House News Service, supra note 151. Uniquely, Hill seemed to base his legislation on what would create the most revenue and where that additional revenue would subsequently go.179See State House News Service, supra note 151. Hill proposed to open up legal sports gambling to all sports, as he believes that is how the state can get the additional funds.180State House News Service, supra note 151. He further believes that the estimates of state revenue from sports gambling being between $50 million and $70 million were “actually quite low,” and proposed that the revenue generated get directed into three separate funds for education, transportation, and health insurance.181State House News Service, supra note 151.
B. Creating an Omnibus Bill
As shown above, the various Massachusetts lawmakers that have submitted sports betting proposals all have differing ideas as to how Massachusetts should move forward with sports betting.182See State House News Service, supra note 151. However, as long as there are numerous bills advocating for different things, it will be extremely tough for Massachusetts to ultimately pass any legislation.183 See generally State House News Service, supra note 151. Thus, in order for the Commonwealth to produce the most optimal sports gambling laws, it must combine the aforementioned bills into one omnibus bill, with particular attention to the attractive provisions in other states’ legislations.184See Dorson, supra note 140.
First, it is critical that Massachusetts allow online wagering as easily and conveniently as possible.185See Betting at an Online Sportsbook vs In-Person Betting, The Sports Geek, https://perma.cc/4FEW-6G65 (last visited Mar. 31, 2021). Gamblers want to be able to wager from their couch and not have to go to a physical location which also comes with having to deal with traffic, parking, and tolls.186Id. Second, illegal mobile wagering is extremely prevalent in Massachusetts and throughout the country.187See Alex Sherman, Legal Gambling from Your Phone Could Be a $150 Billion Market, but Making It Happen Will Be Tough, Cnbc (Apr. 29, 2019, 4:07 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/TLX2-W8D4. As of 2018, Americans wagered an estimated $150 billion in illegal sports bets every year.188Id. Typically, illegal gamblers face nearly zero risk of potential liability as law enforcement generally seeks to penalize only the individual accepting the wager and not the one placing it.189See Robert Pozarycki, Seven Busted for Operating an Illegal Sports Betting Book out of an Astoria Building, Qns (June 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/SS4T-DXQS (illustrating that when a large gambling ring was busted only the orchestrators of the ring were indicted and not any of the gambling clients, despite copious text message evidence). Not allowing online wagering would disincentivize residents from moving their habits from illegal to legal gambling as it would cause both inconvenience and impracticability.190 See Betting at an Online Sportsbook vs In-Person Betting, supra note 185.
Third, by modeling its legal framework after that of New Jersey, which allows companies to easily obtain licenses to accept online wagering, Massachusetts would generate high revenue from sports gambling in both the short-term and the long-term.191See Eric Raskin, 5 Differences Between PA and NJ Sports Betting Law, Penn Bets (May 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/KFW9-4RGK. Currently, New Hampshire allows only online sports betting through DraftKings, and Illinois charges a mammoth $20 million licensing fee to companies before they can legally accept wagers.192See New Hampshire, DraftKings Launch Mobile Sports Betting, WCVB, https://perma.cc/E27J-U72H (last updated Dec. 30, 2019, 7:40 PM EST) (highlighting that DraftKings was chosen as New Hampshire’s lone online operator as a result of it offering the “best financial package” to the state); Paul Caine, Gamblers Still Waiting for Sports Betting in Illinois, WTTW (Jan. 28, 2020, 6:52 PM), https://perma.cc/6KRA-R898Consequently, DraftKings completely controls the gambling landscape in New Hampshire, and no company in Illinois has yet to pay the massive licensing fee required to operate.193See New Hampshire, DraftKings Launch MobieSports Betting, supra note 192; Caine, supra note 192. As the motive for its large licensing fee, Illinois cites the desire to raise “$200 million right out of the gate.”194 Caine, supra note 192.
Meanwhile, New Jersey requires only a $100,000 licensing fee for online vendors, which has resulted in a plethora of online vendors paying the comparatively small fee and registering itself as a legal “bookie” in the state.195See Raskin, supra note 191; New Jersey Sports Betting: Sportsbook and Gambling Sites, Nj Gambling Sites, https://perma.cc/DRH6-27KB (last visited Mar. 31, 2021). As of September of 2020, New Jersey has eighteen online sports betting applications available, compared to eleven retail sportsbooks.196New Jersey Sports Betting: Sportsbook and Gambling Sites, supra note 195. New Jersey also reported online gaming revenue of $52 million in February 2020 alone.197New Jersey Sports Betting Revenue Up Nearly 20% in February, Yogonet, https://perma.cc/SWB9-MXSC (last visited Mar. 31, 2021). The large number of applications available to the New Jersey public has caused the different companies to offer valuable promotions and offers to bettors, such as free wagers or money back on losses, in hopes to entice them to wager through their applications instead of through one of their numerous competitors.198See Betting at an Online Sportsbook vs In Person Betting, supra note 185; New Jersey Sports Betting: Sportsbook and Gambling Sites, supra note 195 (referencing the high number of online vendors in New Jersey). Consequently, these promotions allure bettors to now wager legally to utilize these promotions, which then negatively affects the illegal bookmaker who is unlikely to offer as good a deal.199See Betting at an Online Sportsbook vs In Person Betting, supra note 185. This, in turn, drives higher revenue for the state.200See New Jersey Sports Betting Revenue Up Nearly 20% in February, supra note 197 (illustrating the vast revenue that New Jersey raised in online wagering in just the month of February of 2020, and showing while it is partially skewed due to the Super Bowl, it is still indicative of the popularity and profitability of online wagering).
While Illinois is more concerned with raising revenue upfront through expensive licensing fees, New Jersey has taken the opposite approach by attracting more vendors through smaller fees, which has shown to attract more bettors.201See Caine, supra note 192; Raskin, supra note 191; New Jersey Sports Betting Revenue Up Nearly20% in February, supra note 197. Massachusetts can achieve an optimal system by combining both methods.202See Caine, supra note 192; Raskin, supra note 191; New Jersey Sports Betting Revenue Up Nearly 20% in February, supra note 197. To alleviate Illinois’s concern of not undervaluing the markets and trying to take advantage of these one time licensing fees, Massachusetts can require a higher licensing fee for retail sportsbooks, such as $1 million, but keep the licensing fee for online retailers at $100,000 in an attempt to emulate the system in New Jersey.203See Caine, supra note 192; Raskin, supra note 191; New Jersey Sports Betting Revenue Up Nearly 20% in February, supra note 197. This will allow Massachusetts to capitalize on gaining revenue “right out of the gate,” but also still invite online vendors to apply for licensing fees in order to create a competitive balance between vendors that will ultimately entice and benefit the betting public.204Caine, supra note 192; See Raskin, supra note 191; New Jersey Sports Betting Revenue Up Nearly 20% in February, supra note 197. The higher licensing fee for retail sportsbooks will also avoid the New Hampshire model in which DraftKings controls the market, and the public is unable to benefit from various promotional offers in the same way that the New Jersey residents do.205See New Hampshire, DraftKings Launch Mobile Sports Betting, supra note 192; Raskin, supra note 191; New Jersey Sports Betting Revenue Up Nearly 20% in February, supra note 197; State House News Service, supra note 151. Furthermore, Massachusetts should also adopt the New Jersey and Pennsylvania model of partnering retail sportsbooks with a specific number of online operators, which State Representative Dan Cullinane also suggested in his proposal.206See Raskin, supra note 191; Young, supra note 150; State House News Service, supra note 151. This provides assurance that the online operator will adequately be able to run the technical details of operating a sportsbook by garnering knowledge from its respective casino in regards to the proper way to function.207See Breaking Down Pennsylvania’s Casinos and Their Sports Betting Operations, Bonuscodepa, https://bonuscodepa.com/casino-sportsbook-partner-summary/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2021).
What is also worth noting is that gamblers prefer to bet on credit, which is the system that most illegal bookmakers use.208See John Keilman, Will Local Bookies Survive When Legal Sports Betting Comes to Illinois? The Odds Look Good., Chi. Trib. (June 18, 2019, 5:00AM), https://perma.cc/J3PM-YF3W (illustrating that the convenience of a local illegal bookmaker, as well as the ability to not have to pay upfront before placing a wager, will likely always allow for illegal bookmakers to stay profitable in society). Gamblers do not like the idea of having to put down the money for a wager upfront.209Id. Rather, they like the notion of being given a set amount of credit at the beginning of each week and not having to pay their debt until the end of the week, with hopes that they will be able to win it back by the week’s end.210See Wayne Parry, Sports Betting May Seem Easy. It’s Not. Here’s Why, Ap News (Jan. 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/22SR-X76U. For example, if a bettor loses $100 on a Tuesday, he does not have to pay it immediately, but rather can try to win it back over the rest of the week.211See generally id. Thus, a large number of bettors will likely need to be enticed to make the switch to legal gambling in order to overcome the fact that they are now being forced to place their wagers upfront.212SeeId. See generally Betting at an Online Sportsbook vs In-Person Betting, supra note 185.
This illegal wagering perk of betting on credit adds to the importance of the promotional offers and free wagers that the legal online operators can offer that the majority of illegal bookmakers do not.213See Betting at an Online Sportsbook vs In-Person Betting, supra note 185. A bettor would typically be more inclined to put money down upfront if they know that they will be rewarded with something in return, such as an additional free bet.214See JohnWallStreet, Warning: Over-Regulation Will Push Sports Bettors to the Black Market, Sportico (Feb. 26, 2020, 1:03 AM), https://perma.cc/L4YS-JBXF. The online operators also allow gamblers to collect their winnings immediately, which is something that is extremely attractive to bettors, and something that most illegal bookmakers do not offer.215Id.
Next, Governor Baker’s proposition of a split-tax rate aligns with the aforementioned notion of online wagering focused legislation.216See State House News Service, supra note 151; New Jersey. Sports Betting Revenue Up Nearly 20% in February, supra note 197. If online operators are paying a smaller licensing fee and generating more revenue than the retail sportsbooks, it is plausible to tax those online operators at a higher rate, as established in New Jersey.217See Blasi, supra note 121. Thus, Baker’s proposed 12.5% tax rate should remain for online operators only, while the State should again follow New Jersey in taxing only retail sportsbooks at 8.5% to account for the lesser revenue that they are expected to generate.218 See Blasi, supra note 121; State House News Service, supra note 151. Moreover, Hill’s proposed allocation of sports gambling tax revenue to education, transportation, and health insurance should be mandated.219See State House News Service, supra note 151. Similar to how tax revenue is treated for the Massachusetts State Lottery, this newfound tax revenue should be required to go to repairing roads, funding programs for seniors, as well as improving parks and recreational activities in local communities.220 See Kalina Newman, State Eyes Future of Sports Wagering, Daily Hampshire Gazette (Apr. 7, 2019, 11:38 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/WN76-S4UN.
Moreover, contrary to Governor Baker’s bill, Massachusetts must include collegiate sports wagering in its legislation if the state plans to “compete with the legal market.”221Young, supra note 150. College sports, especially football and basketball, are extremely popular to watch in the United States.222See Chris Crouse, Betting on NCAA March Madness Basketball Games Will Hit $10 Billion, Most of It Illegal, CNBC (Mar. 15, 2018, 8:49 AM EDT),https://perma.cc/U9ZS-LYZJ (highlighting the vast amount of casual gamblers that attribute to the estimated $10 billion wagered on the March Madness Tournament, even including office pools with co-workers and friends); Stewart Mandel, Mandel: Three Theories Why College Football TV Ratings Jumped This Season, The Athletic (Dec. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/ACA9-2CJV (illustrating that while the television ratings of many professional sports continue to decline, NCAA football ratings continue to climb). In 2018, Americans were expected to wager $10 billion on the NCAA March Madness Basketball tournament alone.223Crouse, supra note 222. Moreover, in 2019, in an age of cord cutting and ever-growing entertainment options, while NBA and Major League Baseball (hereinafter “MLB”) ratings plummeted, college football television ratings were substantially higher than the previous year.224Mandel, supra note 222. For example, the weekly “SEC on CBS” game saw a 24% year-over-year increase, resulting in an average of 7.1 million viewers per week and the networks most-watched season since 1990.225Mandel, supra note 222. Further, FOX also enjoyed its most-watched season ever with an average of 3.7 million weekly viewers, which was a 12% increase from 2019.226 Mandel, supra note 222.
Thus, the importance of including collegiate sports wagering in Massachusetts’s bill is critical.227See Young, supra note 150; Crouse, supra note 222; Mandel, supra note 222. It is clear that college sports generate both vast gambling revenue and high television ratings; not allowing Massachusetts residents to legally wager on something this popular would drive many of them to continue to wager illegally.228See Young, supra note 150; Crouse, supra note 222; Mandel, supra note 222. Governor Baker’s bill focused on only professional sports to generate sports betting revenue, in order to remain conservative and not compromise the integrity of sports.229See Young, supra note 150. Resultantly, it is unlikely that the bill would be able to generate lasting revenue without the inclusion of two of the sports that the gambling public enjoys the most.230See Young, supra note 150; Crouse, supra note 222; Mandel, supra note 222.
In conclusion, to achieve both quickness and efficiency in passing sports gambling legislation, Massachusetts should create an omnibus bill based on the various lawmaker’s proposals, as well as the already passed legislation of various states.231See supra Part III. This bill should focus heavily on online wagering and the ability to use promotional offers to entice the public to wager legally.232See supra Part III. Online operators should be charged $100,000 for a license, while retail casinos should be required to pay a $1 million licensing fee.233See supra Part III. Further, the revenue produced by online operators should be taxed at 12.5%, while the casinos should only pay an 8.5% tax to combat the lesser revenue that they are likely to generate.234See supra Part III. Lastly, the inclusion of college sports wagering is crucial to both generate additional revenue, as well as continue to entice the public to wager legally.235See supra Part III.
C. The Inevitable Transformation of the Massachusetts State Lottery
Once legislation is passed in Massachusetts, non-sports related organizations, such as the Massachusetts State Lottery, will likely need to become an integral part of sports gambling in the Commonwealth to avoid a decrease in their revenue stream, as lottery ticket sales are projected to decline upon the legalization of sports gambling in the state.236See Callum Borchers, Who Gets a Piece of The Action If Legal Sports Betting Comes to Mass.?, WBUR (May 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/X2UQ-7AAY. While this would require a unique partnership with the Commonwealth to avoid having to pay a licensing fee for each location that the lottery is sold at, it would be an additional way to ensure that the state does not lose out on tax revenue from the State Lottery that currently funds cities and town, as well as another convenient way for the public to wager legally.237 SeeId.; State House News Service, supra note 151. Many small businesses that sell lottery tickets—a large number of which are owned by immigrants and minorities—could be financially hurt by the impending legislation if they are not able generate revenue from sports gambling.238Borchers, supra note 235.
By allowing local bars and restaurants that have licenses with the State Lottery to offer sports gambling games, such as parlay cards, it could also entice more traffic into those establishments, as well as attract people to place their wagers through the establishment rather than through their local illegal bookmaker.239See Andy Rosen, Mass. Lottery Sees Opening in Debate Over Sports Bets, BOS. GLOBE (May 28, 2019), https://perma.cc/UT97-66T9 (emphasizing that a lot of small businesses that currently offer games like Keno may be dependent upon legal sports gambling in their establishment to maintain sufficient profits). Rather than playing a game of Keno while you have a drink, this partnership could allow patrons to wager on the game that is on the television legally through the establishment itself.240SeeId. Further, allowing bettors to place wagers at electronic kiosks in gas stations and convenience stores, as Illinois plans to soon do, will provide yet another easy, convenient place to gamble legally.241 See Illinois Introducing Limited Betting at Gas Stations, Convenience Stores, Sports Business Daily (Aug. 27, 2019), https://perma.cc/TC7D-PC45 (highlighting that Illinois bettors will “place their bets at electronic kiosks placed in up to 2,500 retailers that are authorized in the first year of the pilot,” and another twenty-five hundred retailers will be “eligible to join the action in the second year”).
