Introduction
“For this by nature is equitable, that no one be made richer through another’s loss.”1Mark P. Gergen, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: What Renders Enrichment Unjust?, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1927, 1927 (2001). Unjust enrichment is a principle of law that requires those who have been “‘unjustly enriched at the expense of another . . . to make restitution to the other.’”2Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 2083, 2083 (2001). The law of unjust enrichment is a relatively recent development, traceable to the work of the American Law Institute and its production of the original Restatement of Restitution in 1937.3Andrew Kull, James Barr Ames and the Early Modern History of Unjust Enrichment, 25 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 297, 297, 303 (2005). However, judges and legal scholars have described this concept long before the creation of the Restatement.4Id. The law of unjust enrichment comes from longstanding principles of Roman law, previously described as the law of restitution.5Warren A. Seavey & Austin W. Scott, Restitution, 54 L. Q. Rev. 29, 32 (1938). While the name and form of unjust enrichment have changed through the decades, the principle that an individual should be compensated for a benefit gained by another at his expense has stood the test of time.6Id.; Kull, supra note 3, at 297.
This Comment argues that while the appropriate standard was used, the Supreme Judicial Court’s (“SJC”) application of the measurable benefit standard in Tody’s Service, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. significantly limits the power of individuals and companies to ensure they are properly compensated for the services they provide. Part I of this Comment explores the relevant component of unjust enrichment, types of contracts on which unjust enrichment claims can be based, current legal trends regarding the measurement of conferred benefits, and how courts interpret legislative intent. Part II examines the background, analysis, and holding of Tody’s Service, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. Part III reflects the way in which the measurable benefit standard has undermined the goal of unjust enrichment in situations where services were not requested but could have resulted in compensation upon acceptance. Part IV argues that the current statutory law fails to address the gray area of the law, which allows police departments to store vehicles as evidence without compensation to storage lots. It further calls for action from the Court to ensure the interests of storage lots and vehicle owners are not exploited by the interests of the police.
I. Background
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A. Unjust Enrichment Versus Quantum Meruit
Unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy that does not involve any express or implied promise or contract.7Pierce Atwood Litigation, Litigants Beware: Unjust Enrichment V. Quantum Meruit, Me. App. (Dec. 10, 2024), https://perma.cc/B9JQ-2KF3. Rather, an unjust enrichment claim “involves compelled performance ‘of a legal and moral duty to pay.’”8Id. The substantive purpose of unjust enrichment is to prevent one party from unfairly benefiting at another party’s expense.9Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 1 cmt. b (A.L.I. 2011). It is not enough that a person has benefited from another to require restitution to be made.10Tedeschi-Freij v. Percy L. Grp., P.C., 172 N.E.3d 774, 782 (Mass. App. Ct. 2021). To make a successful unjust enrichment claim, a plaintiff must establish that (1) a measurable benefit was conferred to the defendant, (2) compensation was reasonably expected, and (3) the defendant had knowledge of the plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of compensation when the defendant accepted the benefit.11Tody’s Serv., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 260 N.E.3d 309, 313 (Mass. 2025).
The first component a plaintiff must establish is that a measurable benefit has been conferred on the defendant.12Id. The benefit is generally measured by the fair market value of the services provided.134 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 14.9 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2026). However, when a plaintiff has provided services the defendant did not request, the law does not allow for typical recovery.14Abraham Drassinower, Unrequested Benefits in the Law of Unjust Enrichment, 48 U. Toro. L.J. 459, 460 (1998). When an unrequested service benefits the defendant, the plaintiff’s recovery is limited to the enhancement of the defendant’s wealth, and it must be quantifiable.15Corbin, supra note 13; see Liss v. Studeny, 879 N.E.2d 676, 681 (Mass. 2008) (finding that an attorney’s services are measurable as the court may consider the attorney’s hourly rate and the approximate time spent on the case). Contra Tedeschi-Freij, 172 N.E.3d at 782 (finding that continued use of an attorney’s name in advertising after attorney’s departure from the firm is not quantifiable). When determining whether a benefit is measurable, the party must be able to delineate the specific benefit from pooled resources.16See Tedeschi-Freij, 172 N.E.3d at 782. Enhanced wealth does not include the costs the defendant saved by not procuring the same services elsewhere.17Corbin, supra note 13.
On the other hand, a quantum meruit claim “involves ‘recovery for services or materials provided under an implied contract.’18Pierce Atwood Litigation, supra note 7. It thus involves enforcement of a promise, and is a legal remedy.”19Pierce Atwood Litigation, supra note 7. Accordingly, a contract is required in order to recover under quantum meruit; therefore, if neither an express or implied contract exists between the parties, the party seeking restitution has no claim under quantum meruit.20Pierce Atwood Litigation, supra note 7. Recovery based on quantum meruit is measured by the fair value of services.21Cape Painting & Carpentry Inc. v. Maher, No. 07-ADMS-40020, LEXIS, at *2 (Mass. App. Div. Feb. 3, 2009).
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B. Express Contracts Versus Implied Contracts
An express contract is created when an offer has been made by one party, the offer has been accepted by the other party, and the accepting party has provided consideration for the contract.22I & R Mech., Inc. v. Hazelton Mfg. Co., 817 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). While many contracts may be expressly created between parties, contracts may also be created without these elements.23See T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1249 (Mass. 2004). Such contracts are implied, either through the facts of the situation, or by the law.24See id.
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1. Implied-in-Fact Contracts Versus Implied-in-Law Contracts
An implied-in-fact contract typically requires the elements of an express contract, but the offer and acceptance are not express.25Willard L. Boyd III & Robert K. Huffman, The Treatment of Implied-in-Law and Implied-in-Fact Contracts and Promissory Estoppel in the United States Claims Court, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. 605, 606–07 (1991). Instead, these elements are “inferred from the parties’ conduct in light of the surrounding circumstances.”26Id. at 607. When a contract is implied-in-fact, the measure of recovery is based on quantum meruit rather than unjust enrichment.27H. Hugh McConnell, Distinguishing Quantum Meruit and Unjust Enrichment in the Construction Setting, 71 Fla. Bar J. 88, 88 (1997). Under quantum meruit claims, a benefit has been conferred even when the desired outcome is not reached.28See Liss v. Studeny, 879 N.E.2d 676, 681 (Mass. 2008) (finding that the attorney’s services conferred a benefit, despite the defendant recovering nothing in the lawsuit). Thus, when a party has an adequate remedy at law available to them, they cannot seek an equitable remedy through unjust enrichment.29Santagate v. Tower, 833 N.E.2d 171, 176 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
Conversely, a contract that is implied-in-law does not need to be made on an agreement that demonstrates assent between the parties.30Boyd III & Huffman, supra note 25, at 607. An implied-in-law contract is created when the law imposes an obligation on a party because equity requires compensation for a benefit that has been conferred upon the party.31Boyd III & Huffman, supra note 25, at 608. Thus, it is not a true contract but rather a legal obligation that is imposed in a search for equity.32Mike Glynn & Co. v. Hy-Brasil Rest., Inc., 914 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009). Recovery for implied-in-law contracts is generally limited to restitution that is available when the other party has been unjustly enriched.33Boyd III & Huffman, supra note 25, at 609.
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C. Recovery for Tow Lots
When an individual or entity has involuntarily received, kept, and preserved another’s property, they have the right to receive compensation for those expenses.34Dines v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 548 N.E.2d 1268, 1270 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990). Courts have held that a benefit is conferred to a defendant even when their vehicles have been involuntarily towed and stored on a police directive.35See, e.g., id. Specifically, defendants benefit from the storage of their property, keeping it safe from vandalism, theft, and even preserving evidence.36Id. However, the amount of recovery is “limited to the fair market value of the stored item,” as restitution is limited to the “benefit bestowed on the defendant.”37Id. at 1271 (quoting 1 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 19A (Supp. 1989 at 53)).
In Dines v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., police recovered a stolen trailer owned by Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (“Liberty”).38Id. at 1269. Upon recovery, the police had the trailer towed to Roger Dines’s (“Dines”) storage facility until the owner’s identity could be determined.39Id. Months later, the storage facility discovered that Liberty was the owner and provided notice that the trailer was stored at their facility.40Dines, 548 N.E.2d at 1269. Liberty refused to pay the storage fees or recover the trailer from the facility.41Id. In the subsequent action brought by Dines, the Court determined Dines’s compensation was limited to the fair market value of the trailer, as this was the benefit bestowed on Liberty.42Id. at 1271. Liberty benefited from Dines storing the vehicle because it was kept safe from vandalism.43Id. at 1270. As such, the benefit received is limited to the fair market value of the vehicle—Liberty could not have benefited from protection from vandalism in an amount exceeding the value of the vehicle.44Id. at 1271.
American Commerce Insurance Co. v. Sturbridge Service Center, Inc. dealt with a similar but distinct issue.45Am. Com. Ins. Co. v. Sturbridge Serv. Ctr., Inc., No. 1785CV02037 1, 1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/C5CQ-Z9CM. In that case, the insured individual was involved in a fatal crash where he was criminally charged, and his vehicle was towed and stored by a storage facility upon police directive.46Id. at 2. The police impounded the vehicle for evidentiary purposes, incurring storage fees for approximately three years.47Id. at 2-3. When the police released the evidentiary hold on the vehicle, $37,825 in storage fees had accumulated, but the vehicle was worth only $100.48Id. at 8. In its judgment, the Court held that compensation for storage services was limited to the salvage value of the vehicle.49Id. at 9. However, the Court recognized the inequity in allowing the storage facility to subsidize the storage of the State’s evidence with little ability to recoup fees and called for legislative action to address this gap in the law.50Id. at 8–9 (stating:
Neither party, nor the court, can find a case directly on point. In analyzing the equities, and finding that this case falls into a gap in the statute; specifically in an instance when the police continue to control access and removal of the vehicle in the storage lot, this court then reasons it must look to Dines’ analysis . . . . [T]he court recognizes that the defendant has also been subsidizing the storage of the state’s evidence and with this decision is left without recourse to recoup its fees. This highlights a need for legislative action to better protect the interests of tow lots and vehicle owners in this narrow area when the property is subject to a lengthy police holds [sic] due to the need to preserve the vehicle as evidence).
While interpreting a statute, the court must ascertain the legislature’s intent behind making the statute.51Gonzalez v. Water Dragon, LLC, No. 17-01425-F, 2019 Mass. Super. LEXIS 1254, at *5 (Aug. 30, 2019). Intent is largely established by the statute’s own words, specifically where the language is clear and unambiguous.52Id. Where there is ambiguity in the statute, the court may look to other statutes and legislative history to determine intent.53Id.
M. G. L. c. 159B § 6B (“Section 6B”) provides appropriate storage charges for vehicles that have been towed pursuant to police order.54Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159B, § 6B (2016). This statute allows storage companies to collect a reasonable fee for their services despite the fact that they have involuntarily towed a vehicle.55Id. However, courts have held that this statute does not apply to storage fees that are incurred when the vehicle is stored as evidence in a criminal matter at the direction of the police.56Am. Com. Ins. Co. v. Sturbridge Serv. Ctr., Inc., No. 1785CV02037 1, 8–9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/C5CQ-Z9CM. This is because storage fees from police holds would result in unjust amounts defying legislative intent.57See id.
II. Tody’s Service, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
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A. Factual and Procedural History
In March of 2016, the State criminally investigated and prosecuted a driver insured by Liberty for a fatal motor vehicle crash.58Tody’s Serv., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 260 N.E.3d 309, 311 (Mass. 2025). Following the crash, the police directed Tody’s Service, Inc. (“Tody’s”) to tow the vehicle and store it as evidence for the criminal investigation.59Id. Tody’s followed the police directive, later claiming “that when [the manager] receives an order from police ‘through the courts,’ he complies.”60Id. at 314. For three years, the police held the vehicle at Tody’s for evidentiary purposes without any contract regarding payment of fees arising between Tody’s and Liberty.61Id. at 312. During a portion of that time, Liberty contemplated pursuing a mechanical defect defense against the policy claimants as the insured driver claimed the vehicle had suddenly accelerated.62Id. at 313. However, the investigation ultimately determined the car crash was not due to a mechanical defect, and Liberty chose to pay out the policy claims rather than pursue litigation.63Id.
After the police hold was released in 2019, Tody’s invoiced Liberty $118,290 for storage over the past three years.64Tody’s Serv., Inc., 260 N.E.3d at 312. Neither the police nor Liberty paid the storage fees to Tody’s.65Id. Liberty offered to pay the salvage value of the vehicle, then estimated at $1,042, or to transfer the vehicle title to Tody’s, but Tody’s refused.66Id. Tody’s then commenced this lawsuit.67Id.
Tody’s asserted claims of promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and violation of Section 6B against Liberty.68Id. The Superior Court judge granted Liberty’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case with prejudice.69Id.
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B. The SJC’s Analysis and Holding
On appeal, the SJC began its analysis by determining whether Liberty was unjustly enriched by Tody’s storage of the vehicle.70Tody’s Serv., Inc., 260 N.E.3d at 313. Tody’s argued it had conferred a benefit to Liberty by storing the vehicle and preserving evidence of a potential mechanical defect that could bolster Liberty’s defense in any subsequent civil litigation with policy claimants.71Id. The Court determined that there was no evidence to support that Tody’s had conferred a measurable benefit to Liberty because Liberty did not pursue a mechanical defect defense in any civil litigation against policy claimants.72Id.
The SJC continued its analysis by examining whether Liberty was liable for the storage fees under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.73Id. at 314. Tody’s argued that Liberty had represented it would pay for the storage fees in full based on a conversation between the manager of Tody’s and a Liberty appraiser.74Id. The Court rejected this argument, finding that Tody’s had not reasonably relied on this statement as it had already been storing the vehicle for nine months on the police directive.75Id.
The SJC concluded its analysis by determining whether Section 6B created a private right of action allowing Tody’s to pursue full compensation for its services.76Tody’s Serv., Inc., 260 N.E.3d at 314. Tody’s asserted that Section 6B did not limit it to pursuing compensation through a lien.77Id. However, absent clear legislative intent, the Court found the statute did not create a private right of action to pursue full compensation of services.78Id.
The Court subsequently denied all three of Tody’s’ claims and affirmed the judgment in Liberty’s favor.79Id. at 311.
Analysis
While the SJC applied the appropriate measurable benefit standard in Tody’s Service, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the application of this standard under these particular circumstances undermines the goal of unjust enrichment as it allows parties to change their position to avoid paying for services.80See id. at 313; Finnegan v. Baker, No. SUCV2009-03772-BLS1, 2012 Mass. Super. LEXIS 306, at *92–93 (Oct. 18, 2012). Additionally, the SJC failed to recognize the gap in the statutory law that allows the unjust enrichment of police departments at the expense of storage facilities and vehicle owners here and in other cases.81See Tody’s Serv., Inc., 260 N.E.3d at 315 n.6; Dines v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 548 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990); Am. Com. Ins. Co. v. Sturbridge Serv. Ctr., Inc., No. 1785CV02037 1, 8–9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/C5CQ-Z9CM . The SJC must provide guidance in these scenarios to ensure the just compensation of storage companies for their services and that vehicle owners are not unduly burdened by paying for unrequested services.82See Am. Com. Ins. Co., No. 1785CV02037 at 8–9.
III. The Current Standard of a Measurable Benefit in Unjust Enrichment Claims Undermines the Overarching Goal of Unjust Enrichment
The SJC appropriately recognized that Tody’s’ compensation was limited to Liberty’s enhancement of wealth based on the measurable benefit standard it used.83See Tody’s Serv., Inc., 260 N.E.3d at 313. Because there was no contract implied-in-fact between Liberty and Tody’s, Tody’s could not recover the market value of the storage services provided to Liberty.84See id. at 313, 315 n.3. Instead, Tody’s could only pursue compensation for Liberty’s enhanced wealth if Liberty had pursued the civil litigation it contemplated.85Id. at 313.
If Liberty had moved forward with the civil litigation and pursued the mechanical defect defense it had contemplated, its wealth would have been enhanced by Tody’s’ storage of the preserved evidence.86See id. In that instance, Liberty’s wealth enhancement would be quantifiable by the difference between the cost of paying out the insurance plan and the damages in the subsequent litigation because Liberty’s entire defense would rely on the preserved evidence.87Contra Tedeschi-Freij, 172 N.E.3d at 782 (finding no measurable benefit where the party could not show advertising provided monetary gain by the law firm). Therefore, the only reason Tody’s could not establish a measurable benefit was because Liberty chose not to pursue litigation after considering it for several weeks.88See Tody’s Serv., Inc., 260 N.E.3d at 313. While Liberty did not request the initial towing and storage services, it was prepared to benefit from them via the civil litigation.89See id.
The only major difference between the case at hand and other case law is the fact that Tody’s and Liberty had not entered into an express or implied-in-fact contract.90See id. at 315 n.3; Liss, 879 N.E.2d at 681. For example, in Liss v. Studeny, where the parties did have a contract, the Court held that an attorney’s services meet the measurable benefit standard when the cost of services is easily quantifiable and the underlying contract proves that the client wished for the services to be performed.91Liss v. Studeny, 879 N.E.2d 676, 681 (Mass. 2008). Legal representation itself is enough to warrant a court to find that a measurable benefit has been found, even when the desired outcome is not reached.92Id. at 681–83 (noting that there was a measurable benefit based on the attorney’s services but did not enforce payment because the contract was a contingency contract).
This distinction provides a loophole in the law of restitution that allows parties to weigh the costs and benefits of accepting services that have been provided to them, undermining the rationale for unjust enrichment. The law typically holds that unrequested benefits fall outside of the scope of unjust enrichment because forcing an individual to pay for services they did not ask for can be unjust in itself.93Drassinower, supra note 14 at 460. In those instances, the services have not been bargained for, indicating that they are not services the other party wanted.94Drassinower, supra note 14 at 460. While there is a strong interest in protecting parties from being forced to pay for services they did not request, there is an equally strong interest in ensuring parties provide just compensation when they are aware of the services they are receiving and are preparing to benefit from them in a way that would otherwise require payment.95See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 2 cmt. b (A.L.I. 2011).
Interestingly, this was not Liberty’s first time dancing around the acceptance of services provided by a storage facility.96See Dines v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 548 N.E.2d 1268, 1269 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990). In Dines, Liberty had knowledge that its trailer had been recovered and stored at Dines’s storage facility.97Id. Rather than making this known to Dines, Liberty did nothing to regain its property and allowed the trailer to remain at the facility, incurring storage fees.98Id. While we can only speculate as to why Liberty chose not to make its ownership known to Dines, these actions speak directly to the loophole in unjust enrichment that Liberty continuously exploits by purposefully avoiding payment for services.99See generally id.
IV. The SJC Fails to Address the Gap in the Statutory Law Which Allows Police Departments to Be Unjustly Enriched at the Expense of Other Parties
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A. The Current Law Does Not Address How to Secure Equitable Payment for Services When a Vehicle is Held Involuntarily for Police Evidence
While Massachusetts statutory law provides for the payment of storage services when vehicles are involuntarily towed, it does not specifically provide for payment of those services when the police order the vehicle to be stored indefinitely.100Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159B, § 6B (2026); see Am. Com. Ins. Co. v. Sturbridge Serv. Ctr., Inc., No. 1785CV02037 1, 8–9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/C5CQ-Z9CM. In that instance, the owner of the vehicle does not have the option to remove the vehicle from storage to stop incurring storage fees.101Am. Com. Ins. Co., No. 1785CV02037 at 8–9. Conversely, the storage company does not have the option to relinquish storage of the vehicle due to the lack of payment for services.102Id. at 8. The fate of the vehicle, and thus the fates of the vehicle owner and the storage facility, rests entirely with law enforcement.103Id. at 8–9.
Current statutory law, like Section 6B, fails to recognize that using a storage facility as a place for evidentiary police holds, while simultaneously charging vehicle owners for the storage, is economically inefficient and unfair.104Id. This practice places the onus on the storage facility and the vehicle owner to work out an equitable solution while allowing the police department to retain the value of storage for evidentiary purposes without any financial obligation—the exact inequity unjust enrichment attempts to defeat.105See id.
Courts have interpreted Section 6B to allow storage facilities to collect the fair market value of the vehicle.106Dines v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 548 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990); Am. Com. Ins. Co., No. 1785CV02037 at 9. While this does allow the storage facility to collect some form of payment, storage fees can often substantially outweigh the fair market value or the salvage value of a vehicle.107See Tody’s Serv., Inc., 260 N.E.3d at 312; Dines, 548 N.E.2d at 1269; Am. Com. Ins. Co., No. 1785CV02037 at 3. As demonstrated here, the police held the vehicle at Tody’s for three years, garnering $118,290 in storage fees.108Tody’s Serv., Inc., 260 N.E.3d at 312. At the point in which the storage fees were determined, the vehicle’s salvage value was $1,042—not even remotely close to the accumulated storage fees.109Id.
In situations where police departments do not have contracts with storage facilities, or where it is unclear whether a contract exists, as is the case in Tody’s Service, Inc., the storage of vehicles for evidence purposes without the requirement of compensation unjustly enriches police departments.110See Def.’s Reply Br. to City’s Opp’n to Mot. to Add City as Def. at 4, ECF No. 9.4 March 15, 2024 [hereinafter Liberty’s Brief]; Am. Com. Ins. Co., No. 1785CV02037 at 9. Police retain the benefit of storage of their evidence without paying a dime, and without a contract or financial resources to pursue a claim against the city, storage lots have little ability to ensure compensation for their services.111See Am. Com. Ins. Co., No. 1785CV02037 at 9. Absent an express contract or a contract implied-in-fact, parties may have little bargaining power with the police.112See Liberty’s Brief, supra note 110, at 4 (stating the police could not help and advising Tody’s to “take [Liberty] to court” in response to nonpayment for services).
While in theory the most obvious solution to this may be to advise storage facilities to require contracts with police departments prior to storing vehicles, in practice it is not so simple.113See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 2 (A.L.I 2011). Individuals and small businesses may believe they have no other choice but to follow police orders even when no court order directs them to do so, and the police do not have the authority to make such orders.114See generally Deena Winter, Small Business Owners Say They’re Pressured to Hire Off-Duty MPD Cops for Security, Minn. Reformer (Oct. 17, 2023, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/4MGW-42H8 (explaining pressure on small businesses to conform with off-duty officer standards despite no official authority to enforce those standards); Katherine Kerwin, Statement from PVD City Councilmember Katherine Kerwin Regarding Recent Events at Fortnight, Uprise RI (July 23, 2020, 1:36 PM), https://perma.cc/S5BB-CZZK (describing harassment from police to intimidate small business in effort to curb political speech); Utah Stories, Will Police Get Away with Local Business Harassment?, YouTube (July 10, 2015), https://perma.cc/CC45-W9YX (showing harassment by police officers in effort to shut down local small business). As noted by Tody’s’ manager, “when [he] receives an order from police ‘through the courts’ he complies,” suggesting that Tody’s had no understanding of what the law requires of it in this situation.115Tody’s Serv., Inc.,260 N.E.3d at 314.
In American Commerce Insurance Co., law enforcement ordered the storage of the vehicle for evidentiary purposes without any contract with the storage lot.116See No. 1785CV02037 at 8. In that case, the police compelled the storage lot to store the vehicle despite the storage lot not knowing who would compensate it.117See id. By the time the police released the evidentiary hold on the vehicle, the storage fees significantly outweighed the value of the vehicle.118Id. As the Court noted, the police obtained free storage of their evidence while only the storage lot and the vehicle owner are negatively affected.119Id. at 8–9. Despite not having an official court order, the storage company followed law enforcement’s directive to hold the vehicle—which was to its own detriment.120See id.
Both Tody’s Service, Inc. and American Commerce Insurance Co. provide clear-cut examples of how this gap in the law unjustly enriches police departments.121See 260 N.E.3d at 314; No. 1785CV02037 at 8–9. Without guidance from either the legislature or the SJC, law enforcement will continue to be enriched at the expense of storage lots.122See Am. Com. Ins. Co., No. 1785CV02037 at 8–9.
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B. The SJC Should Have Recognized the Gap in the Statutory Law and Provided Guidance Regarding the Involuntary Storage of Vehicles for Evidentiary Purposese
Section 6B defines the rates that storage facilities may charge when police order the involuntary towing of vehicles.123Mass. Gen. Law ch. 159B, § 6B (2026). The creation of this statute shows that the legislature intends to ensure that storage facilities receive compensation for their services while maintaining a reasonable storage rate for vehicle owners.124See id. The Court interprets this statute to require notice to the vehicle owner upon involuntary towing and storage—presumably so that the owner may retrieve the vehicle and stop the storage fees from accumulating.125Dines v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 548 N.E.2d 1268, 1269 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990); see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 29 (2025). However, the SJC and the legislature have not defined how the law should address vehicles that are involuntarily stored for evidentiary purposes.126See generally Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 159B, § 6B; see Dines, 548 N.E.2d at 1269.
In Dines, the stolen trailer was stored upon police directive, but it was not for evidentiary purposes.127See 548 N.E.2d at 1269. Instead, the police stored the trailer for the owner to collect once the owner’s identity was established.128See id. The police did not require the trailer to be stored for their own purposes.129See id. As such, the Court did not address this evidentiary issue.130See generally id. at 1271.
In American Commerce Insurance Co., the Worcester Superior Court correctly recognized that the current law does not adequately address vehicles that are held for evidentiary purposes and called for legislative action to remedy this inequity.131No. 1785CV02037 1, 9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/C5CQ-Z9CM. While some may argue that the legislature’s silence over the last six years is indicative of its intent, it is important to note that there has been no other action, such as an appeal to the SJC, taken since the Court released its decision.132See generally id. at 1; Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 425, 430 (1992). The Massachusetts Legislature may be attentive to the decisions made by the SJC, but they are less likely to be attentive to the lower courts’ decisions and thus less attentive to the decision in American Commerce Insurance Co.133See Solimine & Walker, supra note 132, at 430 (stating that Congress may be attentive and responsive to the Supreme Court’s statutory decisions).
Tody’s Service, Inc. embodies the exact issue in the law that remains unaddressed by both the legislature and the SJC, and it would have been the perfect opportunity to resolve the longstanding issue as called for by the lower courts.134See 260 N.E.3d at 314; Am. Com. Ins. Co., No. 1785CV02037 at 9. Because the SJC failed to address this issue in Tody’s Service, Inc., there remains no guidance on how parties in these situations should proceed.135See generally Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 159B, § 6B (2026) (showing that no amendments have been made to address evidentiary police holds). Without guidance, police departments will continue to be unjustly enriched by storage lots holding vehicles for evidentiary purposes without any requirement of payment.136See Am. Com. Ins. Co., No. 1785CV02037 at 9. In turn, storage lots and vehicle owners will continue to bear the burdens of working out equitable solutions for both parties.137See id.
A simple way to avoid this issue is to require police departments to obtain contracts with storage lots to store evidence prior to requesting the lots’ services. In fact, the Code of Massachusetts Regulations may require it—section 7.13 states that police departments must implement policies and procedures that, at a minimum, “ensure consistency of the overall evidence storage retention process. . .”138515 Mass. Code Regs. 7.13 (2026).
By requiring contracts with storage lots, not only would the evidence storage process be more consistent—ensuring that storage lots actually understand how to properly store police evidence—it would also be more economically efficient and fair. Storage lots would no longer need to seek compensation through unjust enrichment or other contract claims because terms of payment would be clear, further resulting in less court involvement. This takes the financial burden off of storage lots and vehicle owners and denies police departments the ability to be unjustly enriched by free evidence storage.
Conclusion
The SJC held in Tody’s Service, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. that Liberty was not unjustly enriched by Tody’s storage of a vehicle because Tody’s failed to demonstrate a measurable benefit that Liberty gained from the storage.139260 N.E.3d at 313. While the Court applied the appropriate standard for a measurable benefit, this standard does not comport with the overarching goal of unjust enrichment and the law of restitution. Instead, it provides a loophole in which parties may receive services that would otherwise require payment but subsequently change their mind to avoid paying for these services.
The SJC failed to recognize that the present statutory law regarding involuntary police holds on vehicles is inefficient and economically unjust. Both storage facilities and vehicle owners shoulder the burdens of involuntary police holds while police departments reap all the benefits. Absent express or implied contracts, police departments may continue to be unjustly enriched by the services of storage facilities, either by the value of the storage services or the enhancement of wealth throughout an investigation and prosecution. The law also fails to consider the unspoken burden placed on individuals and small businesses to comply with misplaced police authority. These parties may feel as though they must comply with police orders, even when the police do not have the authority to make such orders, often to their own detriment.
The SJC should have utilized this case to provide guidance to storage facilities and police departments on how to effectively arrange for compensation of storage services in a fair and just manner. The Massachusetts Legislature has demonstrated its intent to ensure the compensation of storage facilities when vehicles are towed involuntarily, as well as to ensure reasonable storage fees for vehicle owners in these scenarios. The SJC should have used its judicial power to address this unique issue in the law as called for by the lower courts.140See Am. Com. Ins. Co., No. 1785CV02037 at 8–9. Until the Legislature or the Court acts, this inequity in the law of unjust enrichment will remain.
