INTRODUCTION
The question of when a court should look beyond the technical compliance of a transaction with the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) to evaluate its underlying economic reality is a fundamental tension in American tax law. The economic substance doctrine has long operated as a judicial backstop against transactions that technically comply with the IRC but lack any real-world purpose beyond tax avoidance.1 Bryon Christensen et al., Economic Substance Doctrine Codified: Surviving Scrutiny Under New IRC § 7701(o), Crowell & Moring LLP, https://www.crowell.com/a/web/uvfoGiTdQELHs2tCKFowbc/4TtivT/Economic-Substance-Doctrine-Codified.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2026). This doctrine was later codified in 2010 under IRC Section 7701(o) after there was disparity among U.S. Circuit Courts regarding how to apply the economic substance doctrine.2 See IRC § 7701(o). However, codification introduced a new disparity.
Section 7701(o) followed the common law doctrine: a transaction lacks economic substance if the transaction (1) was not motivated solely for tax avoidance and (2) had no other meaningful business purpose.3See id.; Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583–84 (1978). However, Congress explicitly stated in § 7701(o) that the doctrine only applies to transactions “to which the economic substance doctrine is relevant” to limit its reach and to ensure it is reserved for true sham transactions.4See IRC § 7701(o). To determine this relevancy, courts must look to pre-codification law.5 See id.
The added “relevant” language has left courts to determine what the relevancy threshold is. The question of whether courts are willing to create a separate test to answer whether a taxpayer’s transaction is “relevant” is undecided. This uncertainty raises a critical question: should there be a distinct, relevancy threshold test before economic substance is even considered?
DISCUSSION
I. The Argument for a Relevancy Threshold
The primary argument for a distinct relevancy threshold – as advocated by the Tax Court in Patel v. Commissioner – is rooted in statutory interpretation.6See Patel v. Commissioner, 165 T.C. No. 10, 17–19. The Tax Court reasoned that it must give meaning to the statute’s specific language as the word “relevant” would not be included if it otherwise was not intended to have meaning.7Id. at 17. The Court’s analysis rests on Congress’s intent of treating relevancy as a distinct preliminary inquiry. Why? Well, the Court answers that too–because “the statute says so, right there, on its face.”8Id.(explaining that the statue’s distinct reference to relevancy was Congress creating a relevancy threshold). The Patel Court uses the Joint Committee on Taxation’s commentary which notes the doctrine was never intended to disturb “basic business transactions” to further strengthen their ruling.9Id. at 18.
This threshold requirement would force courts to determine whether the doctrine is properly invoked and ensure that it is not used as a catch-all mechanism for the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”); however, it risks creating categorical exceptions. It leaves taxpayers in a persistent state of uncertainty, with insufficient notice as to the doctrine’s scope and application. It creates a problematic result given the magnitude of penalties imposed.10See IRC §§ 6662(a), (b)(6), (i).
II. The Argument Against a Relevancy Threshold
Conversely, U.S. District Courts have ruled differently. For example, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado rejected a separate threshold relevancy test.11See Liberty Glob., Inc. v. Commr. of Internal Revenue, 161 T.C. 153, 154 (Tax 2023), aff’d, 153 F.4th 966 (10th Cir. 2025); Chemoil Corp. v. U.S., No. 19-CV-6314-LTS-JW, 2023 WL 6257928, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2023). Instead, the Courts in Chemoil Corp. v. United States and Liberty Global, Inc. v. United States reasoned that the codification already explained how to determine the question of relevancy.12See Liberty Glob., 161 T.C. at 154; Chemoil Corp., 2023 WL 6257928, at *5. That Section 7701(o)(5)(C) expressly states that whether the doctrine is relevant must be determined “in the same manner as if this subsection had never been enacted.”13 IRC § 7701(o)(5)(C). That since the creation of the economic substance doctrine, for nearly ninety years (beginning with Gregory v. Helvering) there was no standalone threshold test.14See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). And ever since, Courts have not conducted a preliminary screening to ask whether a transaction was the kind historically subject to scrutiny.15See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985); Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 1995); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009).
This understanding is consistent with the Second Circuit’s decision in Bank of New York Mellon, which made clear that codification did not create categorical exceptions to the doctrine,16 Bank of New York Mellon Corp. v. C.I.R., 801 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2015). something a relevancy threshold would create. By adopting the Tax Court’s approach, it would ignore the statute’s plain directive and invite sophisticated taxpayers to exploit judge-made “relevancy” exemptions as new avenues for tax shelters. Additionally, it would waste the court’s time and resources to endlessly inquire into whether the doctrine applies.
III. The Current State of Uncertainty
The divergence between Patel versus Liberty Global and Chemoil creates a significant risk to taxpayers.17See Patel v. Commissioner, 165 T.C. No. 10; Liberty Glob., 161 T.C. at 154; Chemoil Corp., 2023 WL 6257928, at *5. While the IRS stated it would not provide specific rulings on “relevancy,” after the Patel decision, individuals and companies are calling for one.18 See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62.
The Tax Court’s approach in Patel provides more protection for taxpayers by requiring the IRS to provide the doctrine’s applicability before reaching the merits of the two-prong analysis.19See Patel v. Commissioner, 165 T.C. No. 10. Whereas the Liberty Global and Chemoil approach grants the government broader power by assuming relevancy whenever a transaction fails the two-prong analysis.20See Liberty Glob., 161 T.C. at 154; Chemoil Corp., 2023 WL 6257928, at *5. This leaves major uncertainty for taxpayers. The uncertainty could mean that the outcome of a tax dispute may currently depend as much on the choice of forum as on the facts of the transaction.
CONCLUSION
The debate over the relevancy threshold in Section 7701(o) reflects the broader struggle to balance the government’s need to prevent tax abuse with the taxpayer’s need for certainty and the protection of legitimate business planning. While one side upholds statutory integrity and provides a necessary check against the doctrine’s expansion, the other suggests the threshold may also complicate the law and allow some tax-motivated structures to evade scrutiny. With no certainty, the legal community awaits a more definitive resolution that may finally harmonize the “relevancy” of economic substance with its statutory application.

