4th Amendment, Constitution, criminal law, Due Process, Faculty Blog, Fourth Amendment, Friedman, Hansen, New England Law Review, Trump, U.S. Supreme Court

Faculty Blog: The Post-9/11 Weight of Korematsu

Associates of President-elect Donald J. Trump have suggested that the infamous Supreme Court decision upholding the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, Korematsu v. United States, could be used to justify measures aimed at tracking and potentially detaining Muslim-Americans and Muslim immigrants. As Professor Noah Feldman has recently noted, the Korematsu decision is widely regarded today as having been wrongly decided and it has been, as Justice Stephen G. Breyer has put it, “discredited.” But there is another reason why the precedential value of Korematsu has been diminished: its basic premise has been undermined by the Supreme Court’s more recent decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene v. Bush.

4th Amendment, 5th Amendment, 6th Amendment, criminal law, Criminal Procedure, Due Process, Faculty Blog, Fifth Amendment, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Hansen, New England Law Review, Sixth Amendment, U.S. Supreme Court

Faculty Blog: Williams v. Pennsylvania Raises Major Concerns About U.S. Justice System

Professor Eldred wrote that this latest decision is a missed opportunity by the Court that could undermine the long-term value of the decision, particularly when, as Professor Eldred notes, there was significant literature and research in this area available to the Court. Here, I want to address another issue raised by the facts of the case that should alarm anyone concerned about the fairness of our criminal justice system—namely, the role of the prosecutor. While I can’t say that this was another missed opportunity by the Court to address the question since it was not directly before the Court, the troubling story recounted by the facts of the case serves as an important backdrop and raises important questions about the quality of justice in death penalty and other cases. In its recounting of the facts of the case, the Court noted that the prosecutor assigned to the murder case against Williams sent a two-page memorandum to the district attorney requesting approval to seek the death penalty. The then-district attorney, later Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, approved the request by writing: “Approved to proceed on the death penalty.” The case before the Court was about whether the district attorney who penned that approval could some 30 years later sit as one of the justices on the court called upon to vacate William’s stay of execution. The Supreme Court also noted a number of Brady violations that the prosecuting attorney allegedly committed in the case, as well as the fact that none of this information—the prosecution memo and approval by the district attorney or the possible Brady violations—came to light until the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas ordered the district attorney’s office to produce previously undisclosed files, many years after Williams’ trial.

Due Process, Eldred, Faculty Blog, Federal Courts, Judges, New England Law Review, U.S. Supreme Court

Faculty Blog: The Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in Williams v. Pennsylvania

The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Williams v. Pennsylvania, handed down during the turmoil in the presidential campaign over the heated rhetoric on judicial impartiality, adds to the Supreme Court’s growing jurisprudence on the due process requirements for judicial disqualification. The issue in the case—whether a justice on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could properly adjudicate a death penalty case when he had previously been the prosecutor who authorized capital charges against the defendant—set the stage for a ruling that could have provided broad guidance on the due process parameters for judicial disqualification, especially in criminal cases. Yet the Court’s holding may end up having only limited impact. As others have already started to note, the test announced by the Court—“that under the Due Process Clause there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a crucial decision regarding the defendant’s case”—will be hard to prove and adds little additional guidance to what is already available under existing ethical standards for judicial recusal in most states. In addition, my guess is that there are few cases in which a prosecutor-turned-judge will be asked to rule on a case in which he or she was previously involved, so this test is likely to directly apply to only a narrow band of future situations.

Arizona, Due Process, Executive Power, Faculty Blog, Federal Courts, Federalism, Haynes, Judicial Review, National Security, Policy, President Obama, Separation of Powers, Statehood, U.S. Supreme Court

Faculty Blog: United States v. Texas

On April 18, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case of United States v. Texas. The case involves the arguments put forward by twenty-six states, challenging the President’s November of 2014 Executive Action, which could have made around 5 million parents of citizens and lawful permanent residents (known as DAPA) eligible to apply to have their deportation deferred. It would also have slightly expanded the class of pre-existing eligibility for deferred action for childhood arrivals (DACA), already in effect since 2012. The mechanism through which executive action would take place is the President’s request that his subordinates within the prosecutorial arms of DHS to exercise their prosecutorial discretion in determining where and how to use and focus limited deportation resources. Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act, tasking the agencies with enforcing immigration, but provides insufficient funds for the agencies to carry out their mandates. The Executive must then make decisions about how to prioritize those mandates. Neither DAPA nor the expanded DACA class confers anything other than the eligibility for certain persons to apply for time limited deferral from removal. With deferred action, under a different set of pre-existing regulations, passed under earlier Congresses and presidents, comes eligibility for work authorization.

Civil Rights Act, Due Process, Editor Blog, Equal Pay, Gender Discrimination, New England Law Review, Policy, Student Writing, transitional justice, U.S. Supreme Court

Article Preview: Why Is Your Grass Greener than Mine?: The Need for Legal Reform to Combat Gender Discrimination in Professional Sports

Contributing Author: John Kulevich
Sports arose in the primitive era as activities used to train warriors for battle. They continue to this day, though for different purposes: as a form of recreation, as a profession, and as a form of relaxation for spectators watching them. While women who play sports have gradually gained some acceptance in society, they experience gender discrimination and inequality compared to their male counterparts, in the form of lower wages, fewer endorsements, and less media coverage. This is especially true in professional sports. Tanya Dennis, the author of Why Is Your Grass Greener than Mine?: The Need for Legal Reform to Combat Gender Discrimination in Professional Sports, proposes a new statute (the “Professional Sports Act of 2015”), which provides women protection against gender discrimination in professional sports, and explains why the current state of the law is not adequate. For example, Title IX prevents gender discrimination in federally funded educational institutions, and this protection includes prohibition of gender discrimination in school athletics within those educational institutions. As a result of this protection from gender discrimination in school sports, women’s sports have become more popular and received more media attention. Nevertheless, Title IX does not apply to professional sports and therefore cannot protect women from gender discrimination in professional sports.

5th Amendment, 6th Amendment, criminal law, Criminal Procedure, Due Process, Equal Protection, Faculty Blog, Federal Courts, Federalism, Gideon, Miranda, New England Law Review, Police Interrogation, Policy, prosecutors, Right to Counsel, Siegel, Sixth Amendment, transitional justice

Faculty Blog: Luis v. United States and a Right to Counsel for the Rich

By: David M. Siegel The Sixth Amendment, which the Supreme Court has for over half a century interpreted to afford indigent criminal defendants a right to a lawyer at government expense, now also provides wealthy defendants something: protection from the government’s freezing their untainted assets (as opposed to those traceable to, or proceeds of, crime) to prevent retaining counsel of their choice. As principled—and protective of the Sixth Amendment—as this distinction may be, it reinforces something much more pernicious: there is now effectively a right of the rich to be free from impoverishment by the government, to protect their Sixth Amendment right to retain counsel of their choosing, while the identical Amendment does not provide an indigent defendant access to an actual lawyer of anyone’s choice. Luis v. United States, was quite simple: federal law permits pre-trial freezing of certain criminal defendants’ assets that are proceeds of the crime, traceable to the crime, or of equal value to either of the first categories. Ms. Luis allegedly obtained $45 million through health care-related fraud, but when indicted had only $2 million, which the government agreed was neither proceeds of nor traceable to the fraud. Freezing these funds, to satisfy what the government contended would be restitution upon conviction, would preclude her hiring counsel of her choice. If the Sixth Amendment truly conferred a right to hire counsel of one’s choice, then did it also prevent the government from vitiating this right by freezing all one’s resources with which to pay counsel? Yes, the Court found, although not for any reason that commanded a majority.

5th Amendment, criminal law, Criminal Procedure, Due Process, Editor Blog, Fifth Amendment, New England Law Review, Police Interrogation, Policy, Privacy, property, Student Writing, Use of Force

Article Preview: One Step Forward Two Steps Back: The SJC’s Incorrect Decision in Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt Deprives Technology Users of Their Constitutional Rights

Contributing Editor: Cody Zane
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects individual criminal defendants against self-incrimination. However, as the world continues to develop at such a rapid pace and technology becomes synonymous with everyday life, Fifth Amendment protections become clouded. In 2014, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”), in Commonwealth v. Galfgatt, significantly reduced Fifth Amendments protections by failing to extend these rights to the defendant, who was compelled to produce decryption keys encrypting mortgage schemes. Specifically, the SJC lowered the evidentiary burden of reasonable particularity in its forgone conclusion analysis. Additionally, the SJC failed to apply Article 12 of the Massachusetts constitution in its analysis.

Article Preview, criminal law, Criminal Procedure, Due Process, Editor Blog, Juvenile Law, New England Law Review, Policy, prosecutors, School Reform, Student Writing, transitional justice

Article Preview: The (Unfinished) Growth of the Juvenile Justice System

Contributing Editor: Amy Robinson
The juvenile justice system has made dramatic changes over the past thirty years. In three landmark cases, Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court recognized that juvenile offenders are different from adult offenders. These cases marked a shift in the way the judiciary understands the cognitive differences between juveniles and adults. However, despite advancements in the system, courts have failed to properly focus on the goal of rehabilitation.

Due Process, Equal Protection, Faculty Blog, Federal Courts, Fourteenth Amendment, Greenberg, Marriage

Faculty Blog: Recent Supreme Court Term: Obergefell v. Hodges: Equality and Constitutional Interpretation

On June 26 the U.S. Supreme Court decided the “same-sex marriage” case Obergefell v. Hodges. The Court held unconstitutional, by a 5-4 vote, state laws that limit marriage to heterosexual couples. According to the Court, these limits violate both the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the 14th Amendment. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court focuses on the crucial role that marriage, as a component of the liberty protected by the Due Process clause, plays both in individuals’ lives and in structuring society. Denying same sex-couples the opportunity to marry not only affects what type of society we live in, but also impoverishes the lives of a particular group of people in society. According to the Court, individuals define themselves through marriage. In addition, through marriage they access other “freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality.” (p. 13) Marriage is also a means for individuals to achieve the “highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.” (p. 28) Furthermore, children in same-sex families are injured by having to endure the stigma of familial inferiority as a result of the non-recognition of their parents’ marriages. (p. 15)

Criminal Procedure, Due Process, Editor Blog, Mass. Crim. Dig., Sixth Amendment

Mass. Crim. Dig.: Commonwealth v. Valentin

Contributing Editor: Sarah Gage

Commonwealth v. Valentin, 470 Mass. 186 (2014)

I. Facts

In July 1991, Timothy Bond stole cocaine from Angel Ruidiaz, who was selling drugs for the defendant’s brother, Simon. Ruidiaz paid Simon for the stolen drugs, but Simon told Ruidiaz that he was “still going to get” Bond. Later that same month, while Bond was with a group of friends, including Kenneth Stokes, Simon and the defendant approached Bond from behind and shot him in the back of the head. Bond fell to the ground and Simon shot him again in the head. Stokes testified that the defendant next stomped on the victim’s head while making a profane death threat. Then the defendant and Simon fled on foot and, as they were running away, the defendant told Simon, “Man, put the gun away, the police are coming.” At the trial, the defendant’s primary defense was an alibi, calling three witnesses to testify that he was playing dominoes elsewhere at the time of the shooting. The Commonwealth called four witnesses, including Stokes, who were at the shooting. All four of these witnesses testified that the defendant either “kicked” or “stomped” on the victim’s head after Simon fired the second shot. However, only Stokes testified that the defendant made a profane statement while he kicked or stomped on the victim’s head. On cross-examination, two witnesses acknowledged they did not tell the police shortly after the incident that they saw the defendant stomp on Bond. Stokes, though cross-examined, was not questioned about his failure to initially tell the police about the defendant’s statement. On the second day of jury deliberations, defendant’s trial counsel, Robinson, asked for the judge’s permission to have her law partner stand in for her. Although her partner had not worked on the case and had only discussed it with Robinson, the judge granted the request without seeking defendant’s consent to the substitution.