Contributing Author: John KulevichSports arose in the primitive era as activities used to train warriors for battle. They continue to this day, though for different purposes: as a form of recreation, as a profession, and as a form of relaxation for spectators watching them. While women who play sports have gradually gained some acceptance in society, they experience gender discrimination and inequality compared to their male counterparts, in the form of lower wages, fewer endorsements, and less media coverage. This is especially true in professional sports. Tanya Dennis, the author of Why Is Your Grass Greener than Mine?: The Need for Legal Reform to Combat Gender Discrimination in Professional Sports, proposes a new statute (the “Professional Sports Act of 2015”), which provides women protection against gender discrimination in professional sports, and explains why the current state of the law is not adequate. For example, Title IX prevents gender discrimination in federally funded educational institutions, and this protection includes prohibition of gender discrimination in school athletics within those educational institutions. As a result of this protection from gender discrimination in school sports, women’s sports have become more popular and received more media attention. Nevertheless, Title IX does not apply to professional sports and therefore cannot protect women from gender discrimination in professional sports.
Contributing Editor: Cody ZaneThe Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects individual criminal defendants against self-incrimination. However, as the world continues to develop at such a rapid pace and technology becomes synonymous with everyday life, Fifth Amendment protections become clouded. In 2014, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”), in Commonwealth v. Galfgatt, significantly reduced Fifth Amendments protections by failing to extend these rights to the defendant, who was compelled to produce decryption keys encrypting mortgage schemes. Specifically, the SJC lowered the evidentiary burden of reasonable particularity in its forgone conclusion analysis. Additionally, the SJC failed to apply Article 12 of the Massachusetts constitution in its analysis.
Contributing Editor: Amy RobinsonThe juvenile justice system has made dramatic changes over the past thirty years. In three landmark cases, Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court recognized that juvenile offenders are different from adult offenders. These cases marked a shift in the way the judiciary understands the cognitive differences between juveniles and adults. However, despite advancements in the system, courts have failed to properly focus on the goal of rehabilitation.
Contributing Editor: Ryan GoodhueSonja R. West is an associate professor at the University of Georgia School of Law, which she joined in 2006. She teaches courses on Constitutional Law, Media Law, and the U.S. Supreme Court. Sonja earned a B.A. in journalism and communication studies from the University of Iowa. Prior to attending law school, she worked as a reporter in the Midwest and Washington, D.C. She received her J.D. from the University of Chicago School of Law where she served as executive editor of the school’s Law Review.
Contributing Editor: Aysha WarsiRespected author and professor, Clay Calvert, will be a panelist at the New England Law Review’s Spring Symposium on February 11, 2016. Professor Calvert earned his B.A. in Communication with distinction and Ph.D. in Communication from Stanford University. He also received his J.D. Order of the Coif from the University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law. Professor Calvert is a member of the State Bar of California and the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Contributing Editor: Shannon BoyneAmy Gajda is currently an Associate Professor of Law at Tulane University Law School and is internationally recognized for her expertise in the areas of information privacy, media law, torts, and higher education law. In 2013 she was awarded the Felix Frankfurter Award for Distinguished Teaching, Tulane University Law School’s highest teaching honor. She has chaired the Association of American Law Schools’ Sections on Mass Communication and Defamation and Privacy. Ms. Gadja also led the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication’s Law and Policy Division.
Contributing Editor: Kasey EmmonsJames (“Jim”) Gallagher began his legal career as an Officer and Judge Advocate for the United States Marine Corps: serving as prosecutor, defense counsel, and Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Hawaii. From 2006 through 2009, Jim was involved in the prosecution and defense of more than 100 courts-martial. In 2008, Jim deployed to Karmah, Iraq as the Battalion Judge Advocate with 2d Battalion, 3d Marines in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In this role, Jim was the legal advisor to the Battalion’s Commanding Officer advising him on issues involving international law, rules of engagement, and laws of war. Jim was also responsible for monitoring detainee operations, military justice, investigations, claims adjudication for the Battalion and serving as a liaison to local Iraqi judicial figures. Jim now practices at Davis, Malm & D’Agostine, P.C. in Boston. Jim’s practice encompasses advising individuals and businesses on a wide variety of business, employment and litigation issues. Jim represents clients in these issues in both state and federal courts and in front of multiple administrative bodies.
Contributing Editor: Rachel Murray
Contributing Editor: Sameera Navidi
Contributing Editor: John MaraThe Fair Housing Act was passed in 1968 with the purpose of outlawing discrimination by a property owner when renting or selling a dwelling based on “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” Section 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act, which deals specifically with discriminatory advertising practices, prohibits housing advertisements through any medium that show “any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.” Since the passage of that act, applying section 3604(c) has become more difficult due to issues such as internet advertising and First Amendment challenges. This Note examines the federal court system’s interpretation of section 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act. To determine whether an advertisement has violated section 3604(c), the courts use the “ordinary reader” test to determine whether an “ordinary reader would understand an advertisement to suggest a preference for or against a protected group.” In Ragin v. New York Times Company, the Second Circuit interpreted the term “preference” to mean “any ad that would discourage an ordinary reader of a particular race.” The Seventh Circuit also equated the word “preference” with discouraging an ordinary reader in Jancik v. Department of Housing & Urban Development. However, in Miami Valley Fair Housing Center, Inc. v. Connor Group, the Sixth Circuit declined to follow the Second and Seventh Circuits, ruling that the terms “preference” and “discourage” are not synonymous, and therefore the ordinary reader standard should apply any time an ordinary reader would believe an advertisement indicates a preference. These three decisions created a circuit split on the issue of whether the ordinary reader test applies to advertisements that discourage readers, or merely show a preference.