Faculty Blog, Friedman, Privacy

On the Moral Duty to Leave Facebook

In an essay published last November, the philosopher S. Matthew Liao asks: do we have a moral duty to leave Facebook? His answer: not yet. In light of Facebook’s destructive effect on information privacy, I’m not sure the answer to his question shouldn’t be an unequivocal “yes.” Considering the duties one owes to others, Liao… Continue reading On the Moral Duty to Leave Facebook

4th Amendment, 5th Amendment, 6th Amendment, Constitution, criminal law, Criminal Procedure, Exclusionary Rule, Faculty Blog, Fifth Amendment, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Friedman, New England Law Review, Privacy, U.S. Supreme Court

Faculty Blog: Utah v. Strieff: The Court Reminds Us That Constitutional Privacy is Essentially Meaningless

By: Lawrence M. Friedman  The U.S. Constitution prohibits the government from pursuing its policy goals in ways that conflict with individual rights protections—except, as the Supreme Court reminds us in its decision in Utah v. Strieff, where the protection of privacy under the Fourth Amendment is concerned. The remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is exclusion of the evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure. Deterrence of governmental misconduct has been the animating principle of the exclusionary rule for decades (though it was originally just one of several rationales), and the nature of the Court’s cost-benefit deterrence analysis has led it, time and again, to conclude that the costs of suppression outweigh any potentially beneficial deterrent effect. As Justice Clarence Thomas explains in the opening paragraph of his opinion for the majority in Strieff, “even when there is a Fourth Amendment violation, [the] exclusionary rule does not apply when the costs of exclusion outweigh its deterrent benefits.”

5th Amendment, criminal law, Criminal Procedure, Due Process, Editor Blog, Fifth Amendment, New England Law Review, Police Interrogation, Policy, Privacy, property, Student Writing, Use of Force

Article Preview: One Step Forward Two Steps Back: The SJC’s Incorrect Decision in Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt Deprives Technology Users of Their Constitutional Rights

Contributing Editor: Cody Zane
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects individual criminal defendants against self-incrimination. However, as the world continues to develop at such a rapid pace and technology becomes synonymous with everyday life, Fifth Amendment protections become clouded. In 2014, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”), in Commonwealth v. Galfgatt, significantly reduced Fifth Amendments protections by failing to extend these rights to the defendant, who was compelled to produce decryption keys encrypting mortgage schemes. Specifically, the SJC lowered the evidentiary burden of reasonable particularity in its forgone conclusion analysis. Additionally, the SJC failed to apply Article 12 of the Massachusetts constitution in its analysis.

1st Amendment, Contributor Profile, Editor Blog, First Amendment, Free Press, Free Speech, New England Law Review, Policy, Privacy, Sonja West, Symposium, West

Contributing Author Profile: Sonja West

Contributing Editor: Ryan Goodhue
Sonja R. West is an associate professor at the University of Georgia School of Law, which she joined in 2006. She teaches courses on Constitutional Law, Media Law, and the U.S. Supreme Court. Sonja earned a B.A. in journalism and communication studies from the University of Iowa. Prior to attending law school, she worked as a reporter in the Midwest and Washington, D.C. She received her J.D. from the University of Chicago School of Law where she served as executive editor of the school’s Law Review.

1st Amendment, Clay Calvert, Editor Blog, First Amendment, Free Press, Free Speech, New England Law Review, Privacy, publicity rights, Symposium

Contributing Author Profile: Clay Calvert

Contributing Editor: Aysha Warsi
Respected author and professor, Clay Calvert, will be a panelist at the New England Law Review’s Spring Symposium on February 11, 2016. Professor Calvert earned his B.A. in Communication with distinction and Ph.D. in Communication from Stanford University. He also received his J.D. Order of the Coif from the University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law. Professor Calvert is a member of the State Bar of California and the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States.

1st Amendment, Amy Gajda, Editor Blog, First Amendment, Free Press, Free Speech, New England Law Review, Privacy, publicity rights

Contributing Author Profile: Amy Gajda

Contributing Editor: Shannon Boyne
Amy Gajda is currently an Associate Professor of Law at Tulane University Law School and is internationally recognized for her expertise in the areas of information privacy, media law, torts, and higher education law. In 2013 she was awarded the Felix Frankfurter Award for Distinguished Teaching, Tulane University Law School’s highest teaching honor. She has chaired the Association of American Law Schools’ Sections on Mass Communication and Defamation and Privacy. Ms. Gadja also led the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication’s Law and Policy Division.

criminal law, Due Process, Editor Blog, Mass. Crim. Dig., Privacy

Mass. Crim. Dig.: Moe v. SORB

Contributing Editor: Kevin C. Mortimer

Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Board, 467 Mass. 598 (2014)

I. Issue

In Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Board, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) considered: (1) whether the July 12, 2013 amendments to the sex offender registry law (“SORL”) are retroactive as applied to those classified as level two offenders on or before July 12, 2013; (2) whether the Legislature intended for retroactive application; and (3) if so, whether such application violates due process under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

II. Holding

The SJC held that: (1) the July 12, 2013 amendments to the sex offender registry law are retroactive as applied to those classified as level two offenders on or before July 12, 2013; (2) the Legislature intended for retroactive application; and (3) such application violates due process under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.