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Faculty Blog: The President, the Courts, and National Security

By: Lawrence M. Friedman Professor Eric Posner recently explained a dilemma the federal courts face in the wake of President Trump’s election: how to check unconstitutional excesses while, at the same time, respecting the deference afforded “the president on national-security matters” in light of the president’s ability to act “on the basis of classified information,” coupled with the “need to move quickly.” That deference turns on a level of trust of the executive that courts, as exemplified by the unanimous decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in State of Washington v. Trump, may not hold. Posner warns of the possibility that the president, faced with many such decisions, might defy the courts. This raises the question whether the possibility of defiance, in itself, justifies adhering to the traditional deference the courts accord national security decision-making.

Faculty Blog, Uncategorized

Faculty Blog: The Most Important Qualification for a Post in President Trump’s Cabinet

By: Lawrence M. Friedman and David M. Siegel As the confirmation process for President Trump’s cabinet comes to a close, it’s worth noting that Senators have failed to question any of the nominees about their understanding of their constitutional responsibilities under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, much less whether any would be willing to fulfill those responsibilities.… Continue reading Faculty Blog: The Most Important Qualification for a Post in President Trump’s Cabinet

4th Amendment, 5th Amendment, 6th Amendment, Constitution, Criminal Procedure, Exclusionary Rule, Faculty Blog, Fifth Amendment, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Hansen, New England Law Review, Sixth Amendment, U.S. Supreme Court

Faculty Blog: SCOTUS’s Use of Exclusionary Rule Becomes A Charade in Utah v. Strieff

By: Victor M. Hansen  The Court’s opinion in Utah v. Strieff is the latest in a series of recent opinions in which the Court has significantly undermined Fourth Amendment protections by limiting the application of the exclusionary rule. As my colleague, Professor Friedman, noted in his recent post, the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence effectively allows the government to pursue policy goals in ways that conflict with individual privacy protections. The Court has been able to justify this by viewing the exclusionary rule as solely a tool to deter police misconduct. In situations where, in the Court’s view, the exclusionary rule would not deter police misconduct, the rule comes at too high a cost, and a number of exceptions have been judicially created to limit its application. Of course, the exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule to begin with, since nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment suggests a remedy for violations. And it can certainly be argued that, since the rule is judicially created, the courts and specifically the U.S. Supreme Court should be able to modify it as it sees fit. However, on closer examination, the Court’s rationale for not applying the exclusionary rule in Strieff and other recent cases only makes sense if you adopt a rather narrow view of deterrence.

4th Amendment, 5th Amendment, 6th Amendment, criminal law, Criminal Procedure, Due Process, Faculty Blog, Fifth Amendment, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Hansen, New England Law Review, Sixth Amendment, U.S. Supreme Court

Faculty Blog: Williams v. Pennsylvania Raises Major Concerns About U.S. Justice System

Professor Eldred wrote that this latest decision is a missed opportunity by the Court that could undermine the long-term value of the decision, particularly when, as Professor Eldred notes, there was significant literature and research in this area available to the Court. Here, I want to address another issue raised by the facts of the case that should alarm anyone concerned about the fairness of our criminal justice system—namely, the role of the prosecutor. While I can’t say that this was another missed opportunity by the Court to address the question since it was not directly before the Court, the troubling story recounted by the facts of the case serves as an important backdrop and raises important questions about the quality of justice in death penalty and other cases. In its recounting of the facts of the case, the Court noted that the prosecutor assigned to the murder case against Williams sent a two-page memorandum to the district attorney requesting approval to seek the death penalty. The then-district attorney, later Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, approved the request by writing: “Approved to proceed on the death penalty.” The case before the Court was about whether the district attorney who penned that approval could some 30 years later sit as one of the justices on the court called upon to vacate William’s stay of execution. The Supreme Court also noted a number of Brady violations that the prosecuting attorney allegedly committed in the case, as well as the fact that none of this information—the prosecution memo and approval by the district attorney or the possible Brady violations—came to light until the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas ordered the district attorney’s office to produce previously undisclosed files, many years after Williams’ trial.

Article II, Competency, Congress, Constitution, Executive Power, Faculty Blog, Federal Courts, Friedman, Judges, Judicial Elections, Judicial Performance Evaluation, Judicial Review, New England Law Review, Nominations, Policy, President Obama, U.S. Supreme Court

Faculty Blog: The Ninth Justice

At this writing, Senate Republicans continue to refuse even to hold a hearing on President Obama's nominee to succeed the late Associate Justice, Antonin Scalia, on the U.S. Supreme Court. The fullest explanation of their collective decision to ignore the Senate's constitutional role in the judicial appointment process has come from Utah Senator Orrin Hatch who, in a recent New York Times op-ed, spelled out their arguments. In that piece, Senator Hatch attacked President Obama’s judicial appointments for embracing “the sort of judicial activism Justice Scalia spent his career seeking to curtail.” Worse, in Senator Hatch’s view, when Democrats controlled the Senate they were complicit in this effort. Thus, he concludes, voters should decide what kind of Supreme Court they want through the 2016 Presidential election—which can happen only if the Senate delays confirmation proceedings on the President’s nominee, Judge Merrick Garland. He argues that considering a nominee today would be “irresponsible” and, he concludes, not “in the best interests of the Senate, the judiciary and the country.”

5th Amendment, 6th Amendment, criminal law, Criminal Procedure, Due Process, Equal Protection, Faculty Blog, Federal Courts, Federalism, Gideon, Miranda, New England Law Review, Police Interrogation, Policy, prosecutors, Right to Counsel, Siegel, Sixth Amendment, transitional justice

Faculty Blog: Luis v. United States and a Right to Counsel for the Rich

By: David M. Siegel The Sixth Amendment, which the Supreme Court has for over half a century interpreted to afford indigent criminal defendants a right to a lawyer at government expense, now also provides wealthy defendants something: protection from the government’s freezing their untainted assets (as opposed to those traceable to, or proceeds of, crime) to prevent retaining counsel of their choice. As principled—and protective of the Sixth Amendment—as this distinction may be, it reinforces something much more pernicious: there is now effectively a right of the rich to be free from impoverishment by the government, to protect their Sixth Amendment right to retain counsel of their choosing, while the identical Amendment does not provide an indigent defendant access to an actual lawyer of anyone’s choice. Luis v. United States, was quite simple: federal law permits pre-trial freezing of certain criminal defendants’ assets that are proceeds of the crime, traceable to the crime, or of equal value to either of the first categories. Ms. Luis allegedly obtained $45 million through health care-related fraud, but when indicted had only $2 million, which the government agreed was neither proceeds of nor traceable to the fraud. Freezing these funds, to satisfy what the government contended would be restitution upon conviction, would preclude her hiring counsel of her choice. If the Sixth Amendment truly conferred a right to hire counsel of one’s choice, then did it also prevent the government from vitiating this right by freezing all one’s resources with which to pay counsel? Yes, the Court found, although not for any reason that commanded a majority.

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Contributing Author Profile: Steven Gariepy

Contributing Editor: Robin Craig
In today’s ever-changing environment, it is important to understand the interconnectedness of military and civilian life, the role law has in governing the use of military force, and how the U.S. government seeks to reduce civilian casualties in active combat environments. Having been deployed in Afghanistan, Lieutenant Colonel Steven Gariepy draws on his first-hand military experience to confront these issues and how the U.S., and its NATO allies, address the legal and humanitarian complications related with military action. Presenting on topics, including “International Humanitarian Law in Practice” and “Mitigating Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan: The Applicability of International Human Rights Law during Military Operations,” Lieutenant Colonel Gariepy applies practical knowledge and experience to complex, multi-layered issues in a manner his audience can understand.