A Lie Will Set You Free: Exclusion of Deputy Sheriffs From theFalse Reporting Statute
Introduction
A false report of a crime “is a reported crime to a law enforcement agency that an investigation factually proves never occurred.”1 All jurisdictions have enacted false reporting statutes, but the language used throughout varies.2 In 1982, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A (§13A) was enacted, prohibiting falsely reporting a crime to “police officers”; however, the term “police officer” is not defined within the statute.3 The Massachusetts Legislature (“Legislature”) enacted the false reporting statute because investigating false reports causes the dissipation of law enforcement resources, and in doing so, individuals are obstructing justice.4
Based on the case Commonwealth v. Gernrich,5 this Comment argues that a deputy sheriff falls under the definition of a police officer under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A, the statute prohibiting making a false report of a crime. Part I outlines the history and rationale behind the offense of making a false report of a crime in Massachusetts. Part I also generally outlines false reporting statutes in other jurisdictions, and explores the definition and duties of a deputy sheriff and a police officer under Massachusetts law. Part II outlines and explores Commonwealth v. Gernrich,6 the case that held that a deputy sheriff was not a police officer within the meaning of the statute prohibiting false reports to police officers. Part III argues that a narrow interpretation of the term “police officer” is not indicative of the common law interpretation or intent of the Legislature, and that the similarities in the duties of deputy sheriffs and police officers favor a broad interpretation of the term. Part IV argues that the Gernrich Court’s exclusion of deputy sheriffs from the false reporting statute is problematic because it results in false reports of crimes, particularly in correctional institutions, which cannot be prosecuted. Part IV also explores false reporting statutes in other jurisdictions to persuade the Legislature to amend and expand the Massachusetts false reporting statute to reflect the inclusion of deputy sheriffs.
I. Background
A. History of Making a False Report of a Crime in Massachusetts
1. Common Law Creation of the Offense of Making a False Report of a Crime
In response to a request from the Middlesex District Attorney, Massachusetts Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti first proposed the common law offense of making a false report of a crime on November 10, 1981.7 There was no statute in the Commonwealth prohibiting making a false report of a crime before this.8 In considering whether an individual could be prosecuted for making a false report of a crime, Attorney General Bellotti looked to the common law of England in which an individual was prosecuted for public mischief as a result of voluntarily making a report that she knew to be false.9 This was actionable because the police devoted time and resources to investigate the report, which turned out to be false, therefore temporarily depriving the public of the services of the local police.10 Attorney General Bellotti reasoned that in the United States, public mischief is akin to obstruction of justice, a crime against the state, and thus an individual can be prosecuted for making a false report of a crime.11
2. Statutory Enactment of the Law Prohibiting Making a False Report of a Crime
The first statute codifying the offense of making a false report of a crime was introduced in 1972, predating its common law enactment in Massachusetts.12 It was introduced as part of the Proposed Criminal Code of Massachusetts and stated, in part, “a person is guilty of false reports to law enforcement authorities . . . if he . . . knowingly gives false information to any law enforcement officer with intent to induce such officer to believe that another person has committed an offense.”13 However, the statute was not enacted at that time because the Legislature did not yet see it fit to enact a statute of that nature.14
Following the Attorney General’s stated support in 1981, the Massachusetts Legislature found it appropriate to enact the statutory prohibition on making a false report of a crime.15 Thus, Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 269, § 13A was enacted on July 1, 1982.16 The statute has not been amended since it was first enacted.17
To commit the offense of making a false report of a crime in Massachusetts, an individual must make a substantially inaccurate report, which requires more than a report of an untrue detail related to a crime.18 The “untruth” told must “cross a certain threshold of materiality” to be considered a false report under the statute.19 An individual cannot be prosecuted for simply “the telling of any untruth to police that happens to be related to a crime.”20
To successfully prosecute an individual for making a false report of a crime, the prosecution must generally prove four elements: (1) the defendant reported a crime to a police officer, or caused such a report to be made; (2) the report was false; (3) the defendant intended to make the false report to a police officer and it was not made merely by accident or through negligence; and (4) the defendant knew that the report they were making or causing to be made was false.21
3. Rationale Behind the Enactment of the False Reporting Statute
When statutory language was proposed to the Massachusetts Legislature in 1972, the rationale was that prosecution for making a false report would punish those individuals who caused the dissipation of law enforcement resources and the unfounded arrest of a third person.22 The justification provided by Attorney General Bellotti supporting the common law offense followed this prior rationale closely.23 When the false reporting statute was officially enacted in 1982, the same rationale applied.24 Legislative history demonstrates that the false reporting statute was enacted because the Legislature decided that making a false report of a crime is a serious allegation not to be taken lightly.25
The rationale behind prohibiting false reports of crimes has remained steady throughout history, from the common law of England to the common law creation and statutory enactment of the offense in Massachusetts.26 The Legislature sought to deter individuals from falsely reporting crimes because law enforcement officials who were tasked with investigating reports of crimes expend time and scarce resources to verify the reports.27 In making a false report, the individual is obstructing justice, an offense against the state in which an individual interferes with the administration of law and justice.28 There is direct injury to the general public because law enforcement resources are being directed away from “genuine public need” and the orderly administration of justice is being hindered.29 As Attorney General Bellotti argued, an individual cannot and should not be allowed to make a false report as a prank or harmless gesture, and individuals who deem reports of crimes as such should be prosecuted for their actions.30
B. False Reporting Statutes in Other Jurisdictions Are Generally Worded Broadly
Presently, all fifty states, and the District of Columbia, have some iteration of a false reporting statute, but jurisdictions vary in how they have crafted the language of their statutes.31 Some describe filing a false report to “law enforcement authorities” or “law enforcement agencies” or “peace officers,” while others specifically outline the various agencies to which a false report can be made.32 Rhode Island and the District of Columbia are the only two jurisdictions, aside from Massachusetts, that have false reporting statutes which refer specifically to “police officers.”33
Over time, each jurisdiction has enacted a false reporting statute, and many have also amended their false reporting statute to update the language within.34 While the language used throughout each statute may vary, every jurisdiction has enacted a statute prohibiting false reports of crimes in an effort to protect and further legitimate law enforcement interests.35
C. Definition and Duties of a Deputy Sheriff and a Police Officer Under Massachusetts Law
In Massachusetts, the common law offense prohibited making false reports of crimes to “law enforcement officials.”36 More specifically, the statutory enactment prohibited false reports to “police officers.”37 It is therefore necessary to understand the general duties of deputy sheriffs and police officers in Massachusetts, as this Comment will argue that deputy sheriffs are police officers for purposes of the false reporting statute.
1. The Duties of a Deputy Sheriff in Massachusetts
The duties of a deputy sheriff have evolved over time and vary throughout jurisdictions.38 Originally in Massachusetts, the sheriff of each county had the ultimate law enforcement responsibility of maintaining social order, “protect[ing] life and property, enforc[ing] the criminal law, and assist[ing] the courts.”39 The sheriff was vested with “posse comitatus” or “the power of the county.”40 Together, the sheriff and his deputies provided aid in managing and operating the sheriff’s office enforcing the laws.41 Throughout the years, the sheriff has come to be considered the chief law enforcement officer in the county.42
Today, Sheriff’s Departments in Massachusetts, by and through the sheriff and deputy sheriffs, assist in public safety throughout the county, operate the counties’ correctional facilities, and serve process.43 Within the correctional facilities, deputy sheriffs are police officers who may serve in a formal law enforcement capacity.44 Other duties and responsibilities afforded to deputy sheriffs today are vested in the common law,45 such as the power to arrest in certain circumstances.46 Additionally, deputy sheriffs are tasked with serving process, notices, and citations.47
Sheriffs’ Departments are tasked with a variety of other responsibilities that fall under the realm of general law enforcement and police powers.48 For example, the Sheriff’s Departments in Massachusetts have subdepartments and divisions—such as investigative divisions that focus on “evidence and data collection/organization, interviewing, interrogations and intelligence gathering and analysis.”49 While the specific duties of a deputy sheriff can vary among jurisdictions, it remains that “deputy sheriffs have general law enforcement powers.”50
2. The Duties of a Police Officer in Massachusetts
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a police officer as “a law enforcement officer responsible for preserving the public order, promoting public safety, and preventing and detecting crime.”51 Alternatively, the term “police officer” is defined in Massachusetts statutes.52 For example, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 1 defines a “police officer” or “officer” as “any constable or other officer authorized to make arrest or serve process.”53 Police officers achieve their law enforcement objectives by “enforce[ing] laws, investigat[ing] crimes, and mak[ing] arrests.”54
Police officers enforce the laws throughout the cities and towns of Massachusetts.55 Their powers and duties are primarily governed by statute.56 For example, police officers are tasked with suppressing and preventing disturbances and disorders that arise, and may carry weapons.57 They may disperse an assembly of three or more persons and may enter a building to suppress a breach of the peace therein.58 Police officers also have certain powers and duties derived from the common law, such as the broad power to arrest.59 Generally, a Massachusetts police officer has all of the powers and duties of a constable, except for the power to serve civil process.60
II. The Court’s Opinion
A. A Deputy Sheriff Is Not a Police Officer Within the Meaning of the Statute Prohibiting False Reports to Police Officers
1. Factual Background of Commonwealth v. Gernrich
In 2014, Brian Gernrich (“Gernrich”) was an inmate at the Worcester County House of Corrections.61 On the evening of May 16, 2014, Gernrich was in the open area of the tier where he was housed.62 Michael Dean, a corrections officer (“Officer Dean”), was conducting inspections of random cells on the block, and it happened that Officer Dean chose Gernrich’s cell to inspect that evening.63 During the inspection of Gernrich’s cell, Officer Dean noticed debris covering an air vent.64 While Officer Dean was inspecting the debris, Gernrich entered his cell and asked what Officer Dean was doing.65 Officer Dean told Gernrich that he could not have debris covering the air vent and it would need to be removed.66 Officer Dean also indicated, however, that no disciplinary report would be filed if the debris was removed.67 In response, Gernrich stated, “why are you touching my dick?”68 Officer Dean denied touching Gernrich.69
Later that evening, Gernrich reported the incident via telephone to the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) hotline.70 Per protocol, the message left by Gernrich on the PREA hotline was relayed to the on-duty Captain ofthe Worcester County House of Corrections, who then relayed Gernrich’s message to certified PREA investigator and detective, Deputy Sheriff Eric Scott (“Deputy Scott”).71 Deputy Scott investigated Gernrich’s claim by interviewing Gernrich, Gernrich’s cellmate, Officer Dean, and reviewing surveillance footage of the alleged incident.72 After completing his investigation, Deputy Scott found that Gernrich’s claims were unfounded.73 He reported the results of his investigation to the District Attorney’s office.74
Based upon the investigative report generated by Deputy Scott, Gernrich was charged with violating Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A—the prohibition against making a false report of a crime to a police officer.75 During the bench trial, Gernrich argued that a deputy sheriff is not a police officer within the meaning of § 13A, and thus he should not be found guilty.76 The trial court noted that the trend in the case law is to treat deputy sheriffs as police officers, and as such, found Gernrich guilty of violating Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A.77 Gernrich appealed and the case went directly to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for review.78
2. The Court Concludes That the Term “Police Officer” Within § 13A Does Not Include a Deputy Sheriff
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court thereafter reversed the trial court holding that a deputy sheriff is not a police officer within the meaning of § 13A, and that the statute prohibits only false reports of crimes made to “police officers.”79 The term “police officer” is undefined within § 13A.80 The Court noted that when interpreting a statute containing an undefined term, the term should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the Legislature and by its accepted and usual meaning.81 The Gernrich Court looked to various statutory contexts to define the term “police officer,” as used within § 13A.82 The Court adopted the definition of a police officer set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 41, § 98 because, as it stated, this statute distinguished “between the broad class of law enforcement officers empowered to perform only certain police duties and those expressly designated as ‘police officers’ without such limitations.”83 In distinguishing between police officers and deputy sheriffs, the Court emphasized a police officer’s broad powers to arrest, as compared to a deputy sheriff’s limited arrest powers.84
The Gernrich Court also articulated that deputy sheriffs’ powers are primarily derived from the common law, and that while deputy sheriffs do perform some police-like functions, their duties primarily center on nonpolice functions, such as service of process.85 Again, in justifying its reasoning, the Court indicated that deputy sheriffs are merely “peace officers” because they do not have the broad power to make warrantless arrests outside of crimes that occur in their direct presence.86
The Court also reasoned that legislative history did not support the inclusion of deputy sheriffs within the meaning of the statute,87 and ultimately concluded “the Legislature did not intend to subject false reports of crimes made to any law enforcement officer to criminal penalty. Rather, it limited the statute’s reach to those false reports of crimes made specifically to police officers.”88 Further, the Court reasoned that enforcing the false reporting statute narrowly would minimize the likelihood that police would arrest an innocent person based upon a false report made.89 It also reasoned that a narrow interpretation of the statute would prevent investigations into noncriminal activity stemming from false reports.90
Based on the following analysis, this Comment will argue that the common law, legislative intent, and actions of other jurisdictions support a broad interpretation of the term “police officer” to include deputy sheriffs within the false reporting statute.91
Analysis
III. A Narrow Interpretation of the Term “Police Officer” Is Not Demonstrative of Common Law Interpretation or the Intent of the Legislature
A. The Common Law Favors a Broad Interpretation of the Term “Police Officer” to Include Deputy Sheriffs Under the Plain Meaning of the Statute
A statute must be interpreted according to the “ordinary and approved usage of the language” and, ultimately, according to its plain meaning.92 In reviewing case law and the ordinary interpretation of the term, it can be inferred that under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A, the term “police officer” encompasses deputy sheriffs.93
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “police officer” as “a law-enforcement officer responsible for preserving the public order, promoting public safety, and preventing and detecting crime.”94 Additionally, Merriam-Webster defines “police officer” as “a person whose job is to enforce laws, investigate crimes, and make arrests.”95 These two common dictionary definitions of the term “police officer” demonstrate that the duties of both police officers and deputy sheriffs are analogous.96
Massachusetts courts have, on multiple occasions, analyzed and outlined the powers and duties of deputy sheriffs within the Commonwealth.97 As the trial judge in Gernrich noted, the trend in the case law is to treat deputy sheriffs as police officers.98 Massachusetts’s case law demonstrates that deputy sheriffs have law enforcement powers similar to those of police officers, including conducting and participating in investigations.99 Deputy sheriffs also have powers beyond those of corrections officers, and powers that exceed those of municipal police.100 Similarly, the trend in other jurisdictions is to define the term “police officer” broadly for purposes of false reporting statutes to include deputy sheriffs and other law enforcement officials.101 If a deputy sheriff has police-like law enforcement powers, then a deputy sheriff who receives a false report of a crime should be able to pass along this report to the appropriate authority for prosecution.102
Deputy sheriffs in Massachusetts have been defined as “police officers who . . . serve in a formal law enforcement function at the [county jails] and house[s] of correction.”103 In Polonsky v. Cousins, the Essex County Superior Court concluded that the plaintiff, a deputy sheriff with the Essex County Sheriff’s Department, “was a law enforcement officer with police powers that exceed[ed] those of municipal police officers.”104 The Court also noted that deputy sheriffs, like police officers, are public officials because both are “empowered to further the preservation of the law . . . including the investigation of wrongdoing . . . [and are] vested with substantial responsibility for the safety and welfare of the citizenry.”105 As such, in the Gernrich case, Deputy Scott, through his position at the Worcester County House of Corrections, would be considered a police officer because he was serving in a formal law enforcement function when carrying out the Gernrich investigation.106 Deputy Scott’s police-type powers include the power to investigate crimes reported as occurring within the House of Corrections and reported through the PREA hotline.107 This power contrasts with that of a corrections officer, who is only tasked with caring for the custody of the inmates housed within the House of Corrections, and thus has limited law enforcement authority compared to that of deputy sheriffs.108 Because deputy sheriffs are considered peace officers and public officials that possess “police-type power[s],”109 and serve in a formal law enforcement capacity, (including performing investigations within county jails and houses of correction) they should be considered police officers for purposes of the false reporting statute.110
Massachusetts’s courts have also outlined the functions of a deputy sheriff outside of the county jail and correctional facility context, demonstrating that the common law favors a broad interpretation of the term police officer to include deputy sheriffs.111 For example, deputy sheriffs may conduct motor vehicle stops and issue citations for civil motor vehicle infractions.112 They may also conduct warrantless arrests for both misdemeanors and breaches of the peace if committed in the officer’s presence.113 Further, a deputy sheriff can participate in undercover investigations114 or join task forces (a group of law enforcement officials working together to carry out a shared mission).115 As demonstrated, the study of common law powers afforded to a deputy sheriff lend support for a broad interpretation of the term “police officer” to include deputy sheriffs.116
The Gernrich Court distinguished between the broad arrest powers of local and municipal police officers and the limited arrest powers of deputy sheriffs.117 The Court incorrectly concluded that a deputy sheriff does not fall within the realm of the false reporting statute because of this considerable difference in arrest powers.118 The Court improperly focused the bulk of its analysis on this narrow and restrictive difference between the two types of law enforcement officers,119 instead of focusing on case law, which demonstrates deputy sheriffs have police-like law enforcement powers.120 If the Court had alternatively considered the common law interpretation of powers and ordinary interpretation of the term “police officer,” the Court may have correctly concluded that deputy sheriffs are analogous to police officers, and thus should fall within the meaning of the statute.121
B. Statutory Interpretation of the Term “Police Officer” Demonstrates the Legislative Intent to Broadly Encompass Deputy Sheriffs
In reviewing the legislative history of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A, it can be inferred that the legislative intent was to broadly include all law enforcement officers, including deputy sheriffs, within the meaning of the false reporting statute.122 The Gernrich Court looked to other statutory definitions of the term “police officer” to discern the legislative intent and interpret the term, as it is not defined within the false reporting statute.123 Despite the pattern in legislative history, the Court incorrectly concluded that a deputy sheriff is not a police officer within the meaning of the false reporting statute.124
The term “police officer” is defined in various Massachusetts statutes.125 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 1 defines “police officer,” for the purposes of the offense refusing to submit to a police officer, as “any constable or other officer authorized to make arrest or serve process, provided he is in uniform or displays his badge of office.”126 The Massachusetts Legislature further defined the term “police officer” within Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 1 to encompass law enforcement officers of many varieties, such as local and municipal officers (who have broad arrest powers), sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, constables, and any other officer who is authorized to serve process or make arrests.127 If the Legislature had intended to use the term “police officer” within § 13A to refer only to local or municipal law enforcement officers who have broad arrest powers, as the Gernrich Court interpreted, then it would have defined the term narrowly, which would be more apparent through the language of the statute; however, it did not.128
Further, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90C, § 1—not to be confused with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 1, discussed above—also defines “police officer” as “any officer . . . authorized to make arrests or serve criminal process.”129 It is particularly noteworthy that this statute, which broadly defines the term “police officer,” and the statute prohibiting making a false report of a crime, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A, were enacted in the same legislative session in 1982.130 The legislative intent may be inferred to broadly interpret the term “police officer,” in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A, by its review and implementation of this statute in the same year.131 On the contrary, if the Legislature intended the term “police officer” to be narrowly interpreted within § 13A to include only local or municipal police officers, it would have indicated such a narrow interpretation within the false reporting statute.132
The Gernrich Court adopted a wholly different definition of police officer—the definition outlined in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 41, § 98 (“Section 98”), which it found to be the most relevant definition of the term in relation to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A.133 Section 98 “authorizes the appointment of ‘police officers’ for cities and towns.”134 Although the Court correctly pointed out that § 98 authorizes the appointment of police officers in cities and towns throughout the Commonwealth, and provides a non-exhaustive list of their powers and duties,135 the Court incorrectly assumed that this is the proper section under which to analyze § 13A.136 The Court seemed to only apply this statute because it “permits a distinction between the broad class of law enforcement officers empowered to perform only certain police duties and those expressly designated as ‘police officers’ without such limitations.”137 It can thus be inferred that the Court chose to apply § 98 because it excluded deputy sheriffs who do not have broad arrest powers.138 It would have aligned significantly more with the common law and legislative intent if the Court had adopted the broader interpretation of the term “police officer” provided by the Legislature in other chapters that govern law enforcement.139 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A is contained within the general law enforcement chapter titled “Crimes Against Public Peace.”140 The chapter outlines the powers and duties of law enforcement or peace officers in responding to crimes against public peace.141 The specific statutes and crimes within should accordingly be interpreted broadly to include all deputy sheriffs because they are peace officers.142 It should be presumed that the Massachusetts Legislature did not intend for this entire chapter to be limited solely to police officers, but rather it intended for the chapter to apply to all law enforcement officials, including deputy sheriffs.143 As discussed above, the Court would have been prudent in adopting the broader definition of the term “police officer” in its reading of § 13A, in order to sufficiently interpret the legislative intent of the statute as a whole.144
C. Similarities in the Duties and Roles of Deputy Sheriffs and Police Officers Favor a Broad Interpretation of the Statute
The similarities in the duties and roles of police officers and deputy sheriffs lend support for a broad interpretation of “police officer” under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A.145 Both police officers and deputy sheriffs are considered law enforcement or peace officers.146 Courts have generally held that deputy sheriffs have the same law enforcement powers as police officers.147
The duties of a deputy sheriff extend beyond the walls of correctional facilities to participation in police-type duties within the community.148 A police officer is tasked with enforcing laws, investigating crimes, and making arrests.149 Similarly, a deputy sheriff is tasked with investigating crimes committed within jails and correctional facilities.150 Both police officers and deputy sheriffs have arresting powers within the Commonwealth.151 Police officers have broad arrest powers,152 but deputy sheriffs have similar arrest powers, such as the ability to arrest individuals committing misdemeanor offenses or breaching the peace in public.153 Both deputy sheriffs and police officers are tasked with working details to help maintain the peace.154 While a deputy sheriff in Massachusetts serves civil process, police officers do not.155 This is one of the only responsibilities that a deputy sheriff has that a police officer does not.156 Additionally, the Sheriff’s Departments, like many local, state, and municipal police departments, have various special operations units designed to provide particularized law enforcement services and assist other law enforcement agencies both inside and outside the county.157 The similarities between the duties of a police officer and a deputy sheriff within the community validate that, in the context of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A, the term “police officer” should be interpreted broadly to include deputy sheriffs.158
Deputy sheriffs in Massachusetts have the power to participate in the investigations of crimes, both inside and outside of correctional facilities.159 They also may join task forces or specialized law enforcement units, just as police officers do.160 For example, in the Gernrich case, Deputy Scott was also a gang unit investigator.161 Another deputy sheriff testified in Gernrich that he was both a detective and criminal investigator within the Worcester County Sheriff’s Department and also a member of the Worcester Police Department’s Gang Unit.162 The intertwined investigative duties and responsibilities of the police officer and the deputy sheriff lend support to the argument that the definition of a police officer should include deputy sheriffs for purposes of the Massachusetts false reporting statute.163
Additionally, local and municipal police officers do not participate in oversight of the jails and correctional facilities and are not tasked with investigating crimes within.164 Rather, investigative tasks within the correctional facilities are reserved for trained deputy sheriffs.165 It logically follows that deputy sheriffs should be able to exercise their police-like powers and duties to investigate to the fullest extent of the law crimes that occur within their jurisdiction and correctional facilities, and then report those crimes to the district attorney for prosecution.166
Both the common law and legislative history suggest that police officers and deputy sheriffs have similar duties that overlap in significant ways.167 Further, because Sheriff’s Departments in Massachusetts are tasked with operating the jails and correctional facilities within their county, the policelike powers afforded to deputy sheriffs outside of this context should affix to their services within.168 Thus, the Court should have broadly interpreted the term “police officer” within Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A to include deputy sheriffs, in order to establish consistency between the common law and statutory interpretation.169
IV. From a Policy Standpoint, the Court’s Exclusion of Deputy Sheriffs From § 13A Is Problematic Because It Results in False Reports of Crimes That Cannot Be Prosecuted
A. Investigating False Reports to Deputy Sheriffs Would Not Result in Unnecessary Expenditure of Resources Because Deputy Sheriffs Have a Legitimate Law Enforcement Interest to Investigate Crimes Within Correctional Facilities
The Gernrich Court’s holding impedes legitimate law enforcement interests to investigate crimes due to vague statutory language. Sheriffs are the “chief law enforcement officers of the counties”170 and serve the cities and towns of the county.171 The Sheriff’s Department enforces the laws of the Commonwealth within their county and serves and protects its citizens.172 The Sheriff’s Departments are also tasked with oversight of the correctional facilities within their county.173 Through their oversight, the Sheriff’s Departments investigate crimes committed within the correctional facilities.174 The investigation of crimes, and prosecution for the same, is a legitimate law enforcement interest, as is the promotion of “safety, security, and welfare of all staff, inmates, detainees, and all citizens.”175
Both the common law offense and the false reporting statute were enacted to curtail the “needless and unnecessary expenditure of police manpower . . . required when an individual falsely reports a crime.”176 Deputy sheriffs, just as police officers, expend time and resources in carrying out their investigative duties and interests.177 When a person makes a false report of a crime to either a deputy sheriff or police officer, resources are directed away from “legitimate areas of criminal investigation.”178 In the Gernrich case, for example, the expenditure of time and resources by Deputy Scott in investigating Gernrich’s report is surely the type of “squandering of public resources that the Legislature contemplated when enacting the statute criminalizing making a false report to a police officer.”179 As such, those individuals who make such false reports should be prosecuted and be held accountable for the improper diversion of resources.180 Investigating false reports of crimes made to deputy sheriffs would not result in an unnecessary expenditure of time and resources because it is a duty of the sheriff to investigate crimes within the jails and houses of correction.181 Deputy sheriffs should, rather, continue to expend the time and resources to properly investigate any report of a crime.182 If a report of a crime is then found to be false after having been properly investigated, the investigating deputy sheriff should then be able to report it to the district attorney for prosecution.183 It is important that deputy sheriffs continue to pursue their legitimate law enforcement interests, including enforcing the laws of the Commonwealth.184
Through the Gernrich Court’s narrow interpretation of this statute, it concluded that crimes should be uninvestigated and unpunished, as opposed to investigated and prosecuted, where a potentially false report may be made.185 The Court’s narrow holding ultimately permits an individual to make a false report to a deputy sheriff with zero consequences.186 Individuals should be prosecuted for making false reports to deputy sheriffs rather than prohibiting prosecution and thus dissuading investigative efforts that will go nowhere.187 As such, eliminating consequences for falsely reporting crimes to deputy sheriffs impedes and obstructs their official law enforcement duties and interests.188
B. Interpreting the False Reporting Statute Narrowly Prevents Prosecution for Obstruction of Justice
Obstruction of justice is an offense against the state.189 “At common law, it is an act which prevents, obstructs, impedes, or hinders public or legal justice.”190 Obstruction of justice is non-compliance with some aspect of the legal system, such as not fully disclosing information or falsifying statements.191 Obstruction of justice includes failure to report certain crimes, so it would logically follow that falsely reporting a crime should constitute obstruction of justice.192
Generally speaking, the purpose of obstruction of justice statutes, and more specifically, statutes prohibiting the false reporting of a crime, is to prevent an individual from providing false information to law enforcement officials and thus interfering with the performance of their duties.193 As Attorney General Bellotti argued, individuals who “mak[e] false reports caus[e] direct injury to the general public by causing law enforcement officials to squander public resources which ought to be devoted to genuine public needs.”194 Time and resources will be expended to investigate and verify the false report.195 In causing such expenditure of valuable resources as a result of a false report, the individual who made that false report is “obstructing the due course of justice” by directing time and resources away from legitimate areas of criminal investigation and impeding the orderly administration of justice.196 Such obstruction of justice should not go unpunished.197
In interpreting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A narrowly, the Gernrich Court rejects future opportunities to prosecute individuals for obstruction of justice when they make a false report of a crime.198 Under the Gernrich Court’s interpretation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269,§ 13A, an individual, such as Gernrich, cannot be successfully prosecuted for making a false report of a crime unless it is to a local or municipal police officer who has broad arrest powers.199 However, individuals who can, and do, make false reports to deputy sheriffs while incarcerated are interfering with the performance of the deputy sheriff’s usual and respected duties.200 These individuals are obstructing justice, all without prosecutorial consequence under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A.201 Now, as a result of the Gernrich Court’s decision, false reports may be made to a deputy sheriff as “mere prank[s] or harmless gesture[s]” and pose no consequences to the individual who is making the false report.202 This surely could not have been the intent of the Legislature.203
C. The Legislature Should Amend and Expand the Statute to Reflect the Trend in Other Jurisdictional Statutes and Case Law
The fifty states, the District of Columbia,204 and the Model Penal Code all have some form of a false reporting statute.205 The rationale of other jurisdictions in enacting false reporting statutes is starkly similar to that of Massachusetts, discussed above—that individuals should be punished for false reports, which cause a dissipation of law enforcement resources.206 The rationale is similar, but jurisdictions vary in how they have crafted the language of their false reporting statutes.207
The vast majority of jurisdictions, as well as the Model Penal Code, construe the language within their false reporting statute(s) to encompass a wide range of law enforcement officials to whom false reports can be made.208 In contrast, in Massachusetts, only false reports made to police officers are prohibited.209 There are only two other statutes similar to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A that specifically and narrowly reference “police officers.”210
For example, the false reporting statute in Alaska prohibits making a false report to “law enforcement authorities,” but commentary elaborates that this may include “prosecuting attorneys and other persons, rather than mere peace officers.”211 California uses the language “peace officer,”212 which is defined to include sheriffs and deputy sheriffs.213 Other states prohibit false reports to any “official or quasi-official agency or organization,”214 or to any law enforcement authority or agency “within their official concern.”215 Nevada is the only jurisdiction whose statutory language discusses whether a false report of a crime can be made specifically to a deputy sheriff,216 presumably because most jurisdictional statutes are worded broadly enough to include deputy sheriffs.217 Alternatively, other jurisdictions hold that making a false report to a sheriff’s department is sufficient to permit conviction under a false reporting statute.218
The legislative history of a sample of jurisdictions indicates amendments in the statutory language of their false reporting statutes.219 For example, Hawaii amended its false reporting statute in 1984 to expand the language used therein, from “police officer” to “law enforcement officer.”220 The statute was amended to “broade[n] and clarif[y] the definition of the offense.”221 In 1975, Kentucky repealed its false reporting statute,222 and replaced it with an expanded statute prohibiting “false statements to law enforcement officials which are calculated to incriminate another.”223 Additionally, Maryland amended the language in its false reporting statute from “peace or police” officer to “law enforcement officer” for “consistency within this statute.”224 These statutory amendments are an example of the legislative ability to amend the statute based on crucial law enforcement interests.225
The Court in Gernrich had the opportunity to interpret § 13A broadly in line with case law, the legislative history, and other jurisdictions.226 A broad interpretation of the term would have included all law enforcement officers, including deputy sheriffs, rather than just police officers.227 Alternatively, the Legislature should amend Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A to mirror similar statutes in other jurisdictions and include all law enforcement officers, such as deputy sheriffs.228
Conclusion
The Court in Gernrich erred in holding that a deputy sheriff is not a police officer for purposes of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A, the false reporting statute. The term “police officer” should be interpreted broadly, in accordance with the common law, the legislative intent, and the actions of other jurisdictions. The Court incorrectly concluded that a deputy sheriff is not a police officer because of the difference in their arrest powers. Instead, the Court should have focused on case law, which demonstrates that deputy sheriffs have police-like law enforcement powers. Additionally, interpretation of various statutes defining the term “police officer” demonstrate the legislative intent to include deputy sheriffs within the meaning of the false reporting statute. Further, the similarities in the duties of police officers and deputy sheriffs also lend support for a broad interpretation of “police officer” within the false reporting statute.
The exclusion of deputy sheriffs from the false reporting statute is problematic from a public policy perspective. Individuals making false reports of crimes are obstructing justice by temporarily depriving the public of law enforcement services. As such, exclusion of deputy sheriffs from the false reporting statute will result in false reports of crimes, particularly in correctional institutions, which cannot be prosecuted. In response to the Court’s holding, the Legislature should take the opportunity to amend the language of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A to reflect the inclusion of deputy sheriffs.
* J.D., New England Law | Boston (2019). Victoria is a 3L evening student and works full time during the day as a litigation paralegal at Jones Kelleher, LLP.
1✕ Nat’l Sexual Violence Resource Ctr., False Reporting, Overview, NSVRC https://perma.cc/VRE6-NFPC (last visited Mar. 27, 2019).
2✕ See generally State Penalties for False Reporting of a Crime (copy on file with New England Law Review) [hereinafter False Reporting State Penalties] (outlining false reporting statutes in various jurisdictions).
3✕ Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 13A (West 2017).
4✕ 1981-82 Mass. Op. Att’y Gen. 118, 119-20 (1981).
5✕ 476 Mass. 249 (2017).
6✕ Id.
7✕ 1981-82 Mass. Op. Att’y Gen. at 120 (authorizing the prosecution of an individual for voluntarily making a false report to a law enforcement officer).
8✕ Id. at 118.
9✕ Id. at 119.
10✕ Id.
11✕ Id.; See generally 67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 2 (2017) (defining obstruction of justice).
12✕ See The Mass. Crim. Law Revision Comm’n, Proposed Criminal Code Of Mass. ch. 268, § 4, 148 (1972); 1981-82 Mass. Op. Att’y Gen. at 118.
13✕ Proposed Criminal Code Of Mass., supra note 12.
14✕ 1981-82 Mass. Op. Att’y Gen. at 118.
15✕ Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 13A (West 2017).
16✕ Id.
17✕ Id.
18✕ Commonwealth v. Fortuna, 951 N.E.2d 687, 694 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (emphasis added).
19✕ Id. at 693.
20✕ Id. (emphasis added).
21✕ Commonwealth v. Salyer, 996 N.E.2d 488, 493 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013); Mass. Crim. Model Jury Instr. 7.260 (2017). 22 Proposed Criminal Code Of Mass., supra note 12.
23✕ See 1981-82 Mass. Op. Att’y Gen. 118, 119–20 (1981).
24✕ See Memorandum from George Luciano, Secretary, Executive Office of Public Safety, to Andrea Popeo, Legislative Assistant, Governor’s Legislative Office, H-2602 (June 28, 1982) (copy on file with the Massachusetts State Archives).
25✕ Id.
26✕ See 1981-82 Mass. Op. Att’y Gen. at 119–20.
27✕ See Id.; Daniel S. Medwed, Murky Waters? The Law Of Falsely Reporting A Crime In Massachusetts, WGBH NEWS (Aug. 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/VRH7-5PEB.
28✕ 1981-82 Mass. Op. Att’y Gen. at 119. See generally Black'S Law Dictionary 1246 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed. 2014) (defining obstruction of justice).
29✕ 1981-82 Mass. Op. Att’y Gen. at 120.
30✕ Id.
31✕ See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 148.5 (West 2017); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 837.05 (West 2017); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-10-26 (West 2017); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1015 (West 2017); N.Y. Penal Law § 240.50 (Mckinney 2017); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 946.41 (West 2017) (prohibiting false reports of crimes to law enforcement officers, agencies, peace officers, or other governmental or quasigovernmental agencies).
32✕ See generally False Reporting State Penalties, supra note 2.
33✕ See D.C. Code § 5-117.05 (West 2017); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-32-2 (West 2017); False Reporting State Penalties, supra note 2.
34✕ False Reporting State Penalties, supra note 2; see, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law § 9- 501 (West 2017) (amending its false reporting statute from “peace or police” officer to “law enforcement officer” for “consistency within this statute”).
35✕ See False Reporting State Penalties, supra note 2.
36✕ 1981-82 Mass. Op. Att’y Gen. 118, 120 (1981).
37✕ Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 13A (West 2017).
38✕ See generally History of Sheriff’s Office, Franklin Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, https://perma.cc/NQ68-8G8Z (last visited Mar. 27, 2020) (describing the history of the sheriff’s department in Franklin County).
39✕ Id.
40✕ Id.
41✕ Id.
42✕ Id.
43✕ History of the Plymouth County Sheriff’s Department, Plymouth Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, https://perma.cc/3UEZ-H7XT (last visited Mar. 27, 2020); see also Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 126, § 16 (West 2017); 80 C.J.S. Sheriffs and Constables § 56 (2017).
44✕ Hollum v. Contributory Ret. App. Bd., 757 N.E.2d 1126, 1127 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).
45✕ See infra Part III(A) (explaining the common law duties of deputy sheriffs in Massachusetts).
46✕ Commonwealth v. Howe, 540 N.E.2d 677, 678 (Mass. 1989) (authorizing a deputy sheriff to arrest without a warrant if a breach of the peace is committed in his presence).
47✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 37, §§ 11–12 (West 2017); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 220, § 7 (West 2017).
48✕ See Sheriff of Middlesex Cnty. v. Int’l Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 821 N.E.2d 512, 514 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005); Tedeschi v. Reardon, 5 F. Supp. 2d 40, 42 (D. Mass. 1998). See generally Special Operations, Middlesex Sheriff’s Office, https://www.middlesexsheriff.org/specialops (last visited Mar. 27, 2020) (outlining the specially trained units of the Sheriff’s Department, including the Sheriff’s Investigation Unit, the Gang Unit, the Mountain Bike Unit, the Warrant Apprehension Unit, Mobile Operations, Swat, K-9, and the Digital Forensics Unit).
49✕ Investigative Division, Mass. Suffolk Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., http://www.scsdma.org/divisions/investigative-division/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2020). See, e.g., Bureau of Criminal Investigation, Plymouth Cnty. Sheriff’s DEP’T., https://perma.cc/RV6G-9JXV (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
50✕ Tedeschi, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 42.
51✕ Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 28, at 1344.
52✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 41, § 98 (West 2017); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 1 (West 2017); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90C, § 1 (West 2017) (defining “police officer”).
53✕ Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 1. Compare Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90C, § 1 (defining “police officer” as “any officer . . . authorized to make arrests or serve criminal process”), with Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 41, § 98 (defining police officers for cities and towns).
54✕ Police Officer, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/37RJ-XDZ3 (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
55✕ Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 41, § 98 (West 2017).
56✕ See Id.
57✕ Id.
58✕ Id.
59✕ See infra Part III(A) (explaining the common law duties of deputy sheriffs in Massachusetts); Commonwealth. v. Howe, 540 N.E.2d 677, 678 (Mass. 1989) (authorizing a deputy sheriff to arrest without a warrant if a breach of the peace is committed in his presence).
60✕ Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 41, § 98 (West 2017).
61✕ Commonwealth. v. Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d 1196, 1198 (Mass. 2017).
62✕ Memorandum from Detective Eric Scott, Office of the Sheriff, Cnty. of Worcester, to Deputy Dominic Barbara, Office of the Sheriff, Prea Sexual Assault Allegation Brian Gernrich 0061837 1-2 (May 19, 2014), available at https://perma.cc/46Y8-SMU2 (under Briefs, select “Appellant Gernrich Brief,” then see Addendum 2–3 ).
63✕ Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d at 1198; Brief for Appellant at 3, Commonwealth v. Gernrich, https://perma.cc/F2KH-DHXA (under Briefs, select “Appellant Gernrich Brief”) (Jan. 2, 2016) (No. SJC-12078).
64✕ Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d at 1198; Brief for Appellant, supra note 63, at 3.
65✕ See Memorandum from Detective Eric Scott, supra note 62, at Addendum 2–3.
66✕ Memorandum from Detective Eric Scott, supra note 62, at Addendum 3.
67✕ See Memorandum from Detective Eric Scott, supra note 62, at Addendum 3.
68✕ Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d at 1198.
69✕ Memorandum from Detective Eric Scott, supra note 62, at Addendum 3.
70✕ Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d at 1198. See generally Prison Rape Elimination Act, Prea, https://perma.cc/V26M-86YX (last visited Mar. 27, 2020) (explaining that the Prison Rape Elimination Act was enacted in 2003 to address the problem of sexual abuse within correctional institutions throughout the United States, through the use of a hotline set up for inmates to call and report an offense).
71✕ Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d at 1198; Prea Audit Report, Worcester Cnty. Sheriff'S Office (July 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/BW3U-6ZUB (“the Special Services Division will investigate all allegations of sexual abuse and sexual harassment.”). See generally Prison Rape Elimination Act, Worcester Cnty. Sheriff'S Office, https://perma.cc/PF9Y-6LJM (last visited Mar. 27, 2020) (providing that the Worcester County House of Correction, Special Services Division, conducts investigations of reports made to the Prea hotline and may prosecute perpetrators when appropriate through reports of crimes to the district attorney).
72✕ Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d at 1198; Memorandum from Detective Eric Scott, supra note 62, at Addendum 2–3.
73✕ Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d at 1198; Memorandum from Detective Eric Scott, supra note 62, at Addendum 3.
74✕ Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d at 1198–99.
75✕ Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 13A (West 2017); Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d at 1198–99.
76✕ Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d at 1199.
77✕ Id.
78✕ Id.; Brief for Appellant, supra note 63, at 1.
79✕ Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d at 1201.
80✕ Id. at 1199.
81✕ Id.
82✕ Id. at 1200.
83✕ Id.
84✕ Id.
85✕ Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d at 1201.
86✕ Id.
87✕ Id. at 1201–02 (noting that two bills were introduced in the same legislative session: 1982 House Doc. No. 2594 and 1982 House Doc. No. 2602; the former, which proscribed the making of a false report to “law enforcement authorities,” failed, and only the latter, proscribing the making of a false report to “police officers,” was enacted).
88✕ Id. at 1203 (emphasis added).
89✕ Id. at 1202.
90✕ Id.
91✕ See infra Parts III and IV.
92✕ Lowery v. Klemm, 845 N.E.2d 1124, 1128 (Mass. 2006) (quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 190 N.E. 606, 608 (Mass. 1934)).
93✕ Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 13A (West 2017); see Sheriff of Middlesex Cnty. v. Int’l Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 821 N.E.2d 512, 514 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005); Hollum v. Contributory Ret. App. Bd., 757 N.E.2d 1126, 1127 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001); Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 28, at 1344.
94✕ Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 28, at 1344.
95✕ Merriam-Webster Dictionary, supra note 54.
96✕ See Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 28, at 1344; Merriam-Webster Dictionary, supra note 54.
97✕ See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Howe, 540 N.E.2d 677, 678 (Mass. 1989); Commonwealth v. Baez, 678 N.E.2d 1335, 1336–38 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); Sheriff of Middlesex Cnty., 821 N.E.2d at 514.
98✕ Commonwealth v. Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d 1196, 1199 (Mass. 2017).
99✕ See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Buswell, 9 N.E.3d 276, 279 (Mass. 2014); Pixley v. Commonwealth, 906 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Mass. 2009).
100✕ Polonsky v. Cousins, No. 98-1506-C, 2001 WL 95703, at 4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2001); see Howe, 540 N.E.2d at 678 (describing how deputy sheriffs have arrest powers that extend throughout the entire county in which they serve); Baez, 678 N.E.2d at 1336–38 (describing how a deputy sheriff may serve criminal process).
101✕ See In re Standard Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases, 143 So. 3d 893, 901 (Fla. 2014) (defining a law enforcement officer as a police officer or deputy sheriff); State v. Christensen, 302 N.W.2d 448, 450 (Wis. 1981) (holding that the term officer includes a town constable working within his official capacity).
102✕ See Hollum v. Contributory Ret. App. Bd., 757 N.E.2d 1126, 1127–28 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001); Polonsky, 2001 WL 95703, at 4.
103✕ Hollum, 757 N.E.2d at 1127–28.
104✕ Polonsky, 2001 WL 95703, at 4.
105✕ Id.; see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Doe, No. 200600239, 2006 WL 1075586, at 2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 2006).
106✕ See Commonwealth v. Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d 1196, 1202 (Mass. 2017); see also Hollum, 757 N.E.2d at 1127–28; Polonsky, 2001 WL 95703, at 4; Memorandum from Detective Eric Scott, supra note 62.
107✕ Memorandum from Detective Eric Scott, supra note 62.
108✕ Hollum, 757 N.E.2d at 1127–28.
109✕ Sheriff of Middlesex Cnty. v. Int’l Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 821 N.E.2d 512, 514 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
110✕ Hollum, 757 N.E.2d at 1127–28.
111✕ See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Buswell, 9 N.E.3d 276, 279 (Mass. 2014); Commonwealth v. Howe, 540 N.E.2d 677, 678 (Mass. 1989); Commonwealth v. Baez, 678 N.E.2d 1335, 1336 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).
112✕ Baez, 678 N.E.2d at 1337.
113✕ Howe, 540 N.E.2d at 678; Baez, 678 N.E.2d at 1337.
114✕ See generally Buswell, 9 N.E.3d at 279–80 (outlining a deputy sheriff’s participation in an undercover investigation); Pixley v. Commonwealth, 906 N.E.2d 320, 322–23 (Mass. 2009) (describing an undercover investigation involving a city police officer and a deputy sheriff).
115✕ See Commonwealth v. Negron, No. ESCR2005-494, 2005 WL 1669117, at 1 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 22, 2005) (describing a deputy sheriff’s participation in a countywide drug task force); See generally Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1279 (11th ed. 2003).
116✕ See, e.g., Howe, 540 N.E.2d at 678; Baez, 678 N.E.2d at 1336. Cf. Buswell, 9 N.E.3d at 279.
117✕ See Commonwealth v. Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d 1196, 1200–01 (Mass. 2017).
118✕ See Id. at 1202.
119✕ See Id. at 1200–01.
120✕ See, e.g., Tedeschi v. Reardon, 5 F. Supp. 2d 40, 42 (D. Mass. 1998); Sheriff of Middlesex Cnty. v. Int’l Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 821 N.E.2d 512, 514 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
121✕ See Sheriff of Middlesex Cnty., 821 N.E.2d at 514.
122✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 41, § 98 (West 2017); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 1 (West 2017); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90C, § 1 (West 2017).
123✕ See Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d at 1202.
124✕ Id. at 1203.
125✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 41, § 98; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 1; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90C, § 1.
126✕ Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 1 (emphasis added). 127 Id.
128✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 13A (West 2018).
129✕ Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90C, § 1 (emphasis added).
130✕ Id.; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 13A.
131✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90C, § 1; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 13A.
132✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 13A.
133✕ Commonwealth. v. Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d 1196, 1200–01 (Mass. 2017).
134✕ Id. at 1200.
135✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 41, § 98.
136✕ Commonwealth v. Hanson, 464 Mass. 807, 810 (2013).
137✕ Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d at 1200.
138✕ See Id. at 1202.
139✕ See generally, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 1 (West 2017); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90C, § 1 (West 2017).
140✕ Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269 (West 2018) (governing crimes against public peace).
141✕ See generally Id.
142✕ See Id.
143✕ Id.
144✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 1; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90C, § 1.
145✕ Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A.
146✕ Commonwealth v. Howe, 540 N.E.2d 677, 678 (Mass. 1989); see Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 28, at 1344, 1587; Tim Dees, Police Officers, Sheriffs, Rangers, and Marshals: What’s the Difference?, Huffington Post), https://perma.cc/6997-K7CF (last updated Dec. 6, 2017).
147✕ See Sheriff of Middlesex Cnty. v. Int’l Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 821 N.E.2d 512, 514 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005); Dees, supra note 146.
148✕ See Howe, 540 N.E.2d at 678 (holding that a deputy sheriff had authority to make a warrantless stop of a vehicle and arrest the driver for driving under the influence); Commonwealth v. Baez, 678 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (describing a deputy sheriff’s powers to serve process, make arrests in certain circumstances, and issue a citation for a motor vehicle infraction).
149✕ Merriam-Webster Dictionary, supra note 54.
150✕ Sheriff’s Investigation Unit, Middlesex Cnty. Sheriff'S Office, https://www.middlesexsheriff.org/special-operations/pages/sheriff%E2%80%99sinvestigation- unit (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
151✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 41, § 98 (West 2017) (describing a police officer’s broad arrest powers); Howe, 540 N.E.2d at 678 (authorizing a deputy to make an arrest without a warrant if a breach of the peace is committed in his presence).
152✕ Commonwealth. v. Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d 1196, 1200 (Mass. 2017).
153✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 37, § 13 (West 2017); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 54 (West 2017); Howe, 540 N.E.2d at 678.
154✕ See Perotti v. Human Resources Division, No. B-99-799, 14 MCSR 118, 118 (July 5, 2001); Cambridge Police Department, Detail Office, Cambridgema, https://perma.cc/9T2Z-E9T6 (last visited Mar. 27, 2020) (describing the purpose of a police detail, which includes “ensur[ing] motor vehicle and pedestrian safety” in construction zones).
155✕ See Commonwealth. v. Baez, 678 N.E.2d 1335, 1336-37 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).
156✕ 18A Douglas A. Randall & Douglas E. Franklin, Mass. Prac., Municipal Law And Practice § 21.14 n. 19 (5th ed. 2018).
157✕ See Middlesex Sheriff’s Office, supra note 48 (outlining the specially trained units of the Sheriff’s Department, including the Sheriff’s Investigation Unit, the Gang Unit, the Mountain Bike Unit, the Warrant Apprehension Unit, Mobile Operations, Swat, K-9, and the Digital Forensics Unit); Boston Police Department, Bureaus, Bpdnews, https://perma.cc/RB7C-VV6J (last visited Mar. 27, 2020) (listing the various bureaus of the Boston Police Department, including, but not limited to the Investigative Services Bureau).
158✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 13A.
159✕ See, e.g., Pixley v. Commonwealth, 906 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Mass. 2009) (describing how a city police officer and a deputy sheriff, both designated by the court as law enforcement officers, participated in an undercover drug investigation); Commonwealth v. Negron, No. ESCR2005- 494, 2005 WL 1669117, at 1 (June 22, 2005) (describing a deputy sheriff’s assignment to a county drug task force and participation in a drug investigation).
160✕ See, e.g., Negron, 2005 WL 1669117, at 1.
161✕ Br. for Appellee at 3, 10, May 2016, No. SJC-12078.
162✕ Id. at 10.
163✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 13A; Pixley, 906 N.E.2d at 322; Negron, 2005 WL 1669117, at 1.
164✕ See Sheriff’s Investigation Unit, supra note 150.
165✕ See Hollum v. Contributory Ret. App. Bd., 757 N.E.2d 1126, 1127 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001); Sheriff’s Investigation Unit, supra note 150.
166✕ See Hollum, 757 N.E.2d at 1127.
167✕ See Commonwealth v. Howe, 540 N.E.2d 677, 678 (Mass. 1989); Commonwealth v. Baez, 678 N.E.2d 1335, 1336–37 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).
168✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 126, § 16 (West 2017); Hollum, 757 N.E.2d at 1127.
169✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 13A (West 2017).
170✕ Massachusetts Sheriffs’ Association, Mission Statement, MASS.GOV, https://perma.cc/4JZ5- NBE4 (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
171✕ See Worcester Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, Mission, Worcestercountysheriff.Com, https://perma.cc/AZ5K-EPSE (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
172✕ Suffolk Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, Sheriff’s Office Overview, Scsdma.Org, http://www.scsdma.org/sheriffs-office/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
173✕ Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 126, § 16 (West 2017).
174✕ Sheriff’s Investigation Unit, supra note 150.
175✕ Sheriff’s Investigation Unit, supra note 150.
176✕ Br. for Appellee, supra note 161, at 17. 177 1981–82 Mass. Op. Att’y Gen. 118, 119 (1981).
178✕ Id. at 120.
179✕ Br. for Appellee, supra note 161, at 18.
180✕ See 1981–82 Mass. Op. Att’y Gen. at 120.
181✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 126, § 16 (West 2017); Sheriff’s Investigation Unit, supra note 150.
182✕ See 1981–82 Mass. Op. Att’y Gen. at 118.
183✕ See Id. at 120.
184✕ See Suffolk Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, supra note 172.
185✕ See Commonwealth v. Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d 1196, 1203 (Mass. 2017).
186✕ See Id.
187✕ See Id.
188✕ See Id. 189 1981–82 Mass. Op. Att’y Gen. 118, 119 (1981).
190✕ Obstructing Justice, supra note 11, § 2.
191✕ Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 28.
192✕ See 2 Mass. Proof Of Cases Failure To Report Certain Crimes § 58:9 (2016); 1981-82 Mass. Op. Att’y Gen. at 119–20.
193✕ See 58 Am. Jur. 2d Obstructing Justice § 61 (2017).
194✕ 1981–82 Mass. Op. Att’y Gen. at 120.
195✕ Id.
196✕ Id.
197✕ See generally Am. Jur. 2d Obstructing Justice, supra note 193.
198✕ See Commonwealth v. Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d 1196, 1203 (Mass. 2017).
199✕ See Id. 200 58 Am. Jur. 2d Obstructing Justice, supra note 193.
201✕ 1981–82 Mass. Op. Att’y Gen. 118, 119 (1981).
202✕ Id.
203✕ See Id. at 119–20.
204✕ False Reporting State Penalties, supra note 2.
205✕ Model Penal Code § 241.5 (1985); False Reporting State Penalties, supra note 2.
206✕ See supra Part I(A)(3). See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-4 (2016) (quoting The Assembly Law and Public Safety Committee report that “false police reports abuse valuable public resources and endanger the entire community by diverting the efforts of law enforcement away from genuine criminal activity. Enhancing the penalties for these crimes will deter persons from filing these reports and squandering public resources.”).
207✕ See False Reporting State Penalties, supra note 2.
208✕ See False Reporting State Penalties, supra note 2; Model Penal Code § 241.5 (explaining that while not law in any jurisdiction, the Model Penal Code provides guidance and was relied upon by numerous states when enacting their false reporting statutes). See generally The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, Ali.Org, https://perma.cc/VP7V-8FV7 (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
209✕ Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 13A (West 2017) (emphasis added).
210✕ See D.C. Code § 5-117.05 (2017) (prohibiting false reports made to “the Metropolitan Police force of the District of Columbia, or to any officer or member thereof”); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann.§ 11-32-2 (West 2017) (requiring that the false report must be “relied upon by a police officer of any city or town” or a “member of the state police”).
211✕ Alaska Stat. Ann. § 11.56.800 (West 2017).
212✕ Cal. Penal Code § 148.5 (West 2017).
213✕ Cal. Penal Code § 830.1 (West 2017) (defining a peace officer to include a sheriff, undersheriff, or deputy sheriff).
214✕ See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-180 (West 2017); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1245 (West 2017).
215✕ See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-8-111 (West 2017); Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 575.080 (West 2017).
216✕ Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 207.280 (West 2017).
217✕ See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-10-9 (2017) (indicating that the term law enforcement authorities is construed broadly); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 837.05 (West 2017) (prohibiting false reports to law enforcement officials, which encompasses deputy sheriffs).
218✕ See State v. Christensen, 302 N.W.2d 448, 450 (Wis. 1981) (holding that a town constable was an officer for purposes of the false reporting statute); Harman v. State, 556 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (finding that a report conveying false information to a Sheriff’s Department sufficed to permit conviction under the false reporting statute).
219✕ See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1015 (West 2017); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519.040 (West 2017); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 9-501 (West 2017).
220✕ Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1015.
221✕ Id.
222✕ Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 437.018 (repealed 1974). 223 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519.040.
224✕ Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law § 9-501.
225✕ See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1015; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519.040; Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law § 9-501.
226✕ See Commonwealth. v. Gernrich, 67 N.E.3d 1196, 1202–03 (Mass. 2017).
227✕ See Id. at 1202.
228✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 13A (West 2017).