Voting Right Issues Are Not a Thing of the Past: Voter Registrations Disenfranchise Thousands
Introduction
Voter registrations were implemented to combat voter fraud and end disruptive election day conflicts at the polls.1 However, unnecessary barriers to voter registrations deter millions of eligible voters from voting every year.2 Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth illustrates one of many barriers to voter registration that has a substantial effect on otherwise qualified voters. 3 In 1993, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts enacted a voter registration statute (“Voter Cutoff Law”), which requires individuals to register to vote twenty days prior to any election.4 This deadline disenfranchises eligible voters that have recently moved 5 or are unable to take a day off of work to register.6
Congress enacted the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”) to make registration and voting easier for all eligible citizens and to prohibit registration deadlines that exceeded thirty days.7 A state is exempt from NVRA provisions if they offer same day registration for federal elections.8 However, many states—including Massachusetts—continue to maintain an arbitrary deadline, relying on the claim that time is needed to process the registration materials prior to election day to verify the accuracy of registration.9 In the past few years, with technological advancements, other states have committed to increasing voter participation by offering same day registration and automatic voting registration.10
This Comment addresses the burden voter registration deadlines impose on an individual’s right to vote and argues that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) ignored important precedent when it concluded that rational basis applied in Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth. The SJC also incorrectly concluded that the voter registration deadline does not disenfranchise any eligible voter. Part I of this Comment details voting as a fundamental right under the Massachusetts Constitution and the history of voter registration laws in Massachusetts. Part II discusses Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, focusing on the SJC’s opinion that the Voter Cutoff Law did not substantially interfere with the right to vote and thus was subject to rational basis review. Part III argues the correct standard of review was established in 1887 in Kineen v. Wells, which requires that the statute be necessary in order to be constitutional; alternatively, the correct standard was strict scrutiny under Cepulonis v. Secretary of the Commonwealth. Part IV examines the various ways that the registration deadline disenfranchises thousands of individuals every year.
I. Background
A. Voting Rights Guaranteed to Massachusetts Citizens
The Massachusetts Constitution guarantees the right to vote in Article 9 of the Declaration of Rights and in Article 3 of the Amendments,11 as well as implicitly protecting the right under other provisions of the Declaration of Rights.12 The SJC has long recognized the right to vote as a fundamental personal and political right. 13 Therefore, any statute that significantly interferes with a fundamental right is reviewed using strict scrutiny. 14 Statutes, such as those creating voter registration deadlines, that do not constitute a significant interference, but act as a regulation, are subject to rational basis review.15
B. Voter Cutoff Law
Voting registrations began in the late 1800s as a way to reduce voting fraud and combat “disruptive election-day conflicts.”16 Registering to vote is a process of filling out a form with required identifying information, such as one’s name, citizenship, and date of birth, and submitting the form for processing. 17 Forty-nine states have some sort of voting registration regulation, while North Dakota does not.18
Currently, more than half of the states require a voter to register to vote prior to election day in order to cast a vote, while seventeen states allow election day registration.19 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 51, § 26 requires individuals to register twenty days prior to an election in order to be afforded the right to vote in that election.20 Section 34 explicitly instructs registrars not to register any person to vote after the deadline.21
Similar to the nationwide start of voter registration, the Massachusetts voter registration requirement was enacted in 1874.22 The law permitted individuals in a town or city with a population of more than one thousand to register the day before elections. 23 A longer blackout period was established in 1877 and 1879.24 In 1947, the deadline exceeded thirty days, but was reduced in 1973 to twenty-eight days before election day.25 After Congress enacted the NVRA, which prohibited state voter registration blackout periods longer than thirty days prior to any Federal election,26 the Massachusetts legislature enacted its own version of this law and reduced the deadline to twenty days.27 In 2014, the legislature enacted Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 54, § 25B, which allowed qualified voters to vote early for any biennial state election.28 Again, in June 2018, the Massachusetts House of Representatives passed an automatic voter registration bill, which would allow eligible residents to register to vote when they renew their driver’s license at the Registry of Motor Vehicles or apply for MassHealth.29
C. How Massachusetts Determines the Constitutionality of Voter Regulations
The SJC first encountered a voter registration challenge in 1887.30 In Kinneen v. Wells, the Court rejected a voter registration law on the grounds that it refused to register voters who were otherwise eligible under the state constitution.31 In Kinneen, the Court recognized the legislative objective in a preregistration system of voting. 32 However, the Court rejected the legislature’s statute that refused to register an individual because he had not been naturalized within thirty days prior to registering.33 The Court held a regulation that interferes with an individual’s right to vote is unconstitutional unless it is reasonable and necessary.34 Again, in 1983, the SJC encountered a voter registration challenge.35 In Cepulonis v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, prisoners incarcerated in Massachusetts challenged the denial of their registration to vote.36 The SJC applied strict scrutiny, holding that “prisoners domiciled in Massachusetts who are unable to register to vote by reason of their incarceration must be provided with an opportunity to register to vote.”37 Further, the Court concluded, “to the extent that G. L. c. 51 and c. 54 prevent prisoners domiciled in Massachusetts from registering to vote, they are unconstitutional.”38
II. Court’s Opinion
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
Three individuals, Rafael Sanchez, Edma Ortiz, and Wilyeliz Nazario, registered to vote less than twenty days before the November 2016 presidential election.39 The three original individual plaintiffs, joined by two voter registration organizations, Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. and MASSVote, Inc., brought an action against the Secretary of the Commonwealth and the Cities of Chelsea, Revere, and Somerville. 40 The complaint, filed on November 1, 2016, sought a preliminary injunction allowing the three individuals to cast ballots in the November 2016 election.41 A hearing was held on November 7, 2016, and thereafter, a superior court judge granted the request for a preliminary injunction, ordering the defendants to accept and count the plaintiffs’ provisional ballots.42
Prior to trial, two original plaintiffs were dismissed from the case.43 Wilyeliz Nazario was dismissed voluntarily and Edma Ortiz was dismissed for lack of an actual controversy.44 After a bench trial in July 2017, the superior court judge ruled that the twenty-day deadline was unconstitutional because it denied “constitutionally qualified voters the right to cast a ballot.”45 The Secretary of the Commonwealth appealed and the parties submitted a joint application for direct appellate review, which the SJC granted.46
B. Court’s Analysis
The Court began its analysis by determining whether the rational basis test or strict scrutiny applied to the twenty-day voter registration requirement.47 This was the first time the Court had directly reviewed the length of time for voter registration requirements.48 However, the Court reasoned the passage of time could affect the position of whether a regulation significantly interferes with an individual’s exercise of the right to vote. 49 Due to technological advancements, a regulation that “insignificantly interfered with the right to vote thirty-five, one hundred, or 200 years ago” could have a different affect today.50 With this in mind, the Court reasoned that an individual had ample opportunity to register prior to the deadline and the Commonwealth took “great steps” to notify residents about the deadline and registration processes.51 For example, the Secretary mails each resident a booklet containing instructions on how to register and the form each individual would need to fill out. 52 These instructions and forms are also available at various public facilities.53 The Court recognized that an individual could register to vote in person, online, or by mail.54 Moreover, a person could register to vote “at his or her city or town hall, at any registry of motor vehicles location, or through any state agency ‘that provide[s] public assistance or assistance to people with disabilities.’”55 Thus, the Court concluded the registration deadline does not disenfranchise any qualified voter.56
The Court applied rational basis review, after determining there was not a significant interference with an individual’s exercise of the right to vote.57 The rational basis test, under the due process clause, “requires that statutes ‘bear a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of the general welfare.’”58 Under the equal protection clause, rational basis requires a showing “that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class.” 59 In voting registration requirements, the Court deferred to the legislature to promote orderly and legitimate elections.60 The voting process requires local election officials to process voter registration applications, screen them for errors, and confirm voter qualifications. 61 Also, the processing system requires election officials to recruit and train poll workers, test elections-related machines, and print voter lists.62 The Court recognized the consequence a deadline imposes on qualified citizens not yet registered to vote, but nonetheless reasoned the legislative objective outweighed the harm to otherwise qualified voters. 63 The legislative objective asserted by the Secretary was “conducting orderly and legitimate elections.”64
After determining that there must be a reasonable legislative objective for a requirement of voting registration, the Court clarified the deadline must be “as near to election day” as reasonably appropriate for the legislature to effectuate its goal. 65 Next, the Court went through the legislative history to determine if the twenty-day deadline furthered the legislative objective.66 The Court again deferred to the legislature that a twenty-day deadline was necessary, as opposed to a seven-day deadline, because, at the time, the legislature was considering other election law reforms in 1993.67 Although no attempts were made in reconsidering the twenty-day deadline, the Court emphasized the need for legislative reconsideration. 68 Finally, the Court concluded the legislature presumptively does not act arbitrarily, but rather, has continuously conferred on the deadline.69
C. Court’s Holding
In applying rational basis review, the SJC reversed the superior court’s ruling and held the Massachusetts twenty-day blackout period for voter registration did not violate the Massachusetts Constitution. 70 The Court determined rational basis applies to the constitutionality of voter registration requirements.71 Also, the legislature had a legitimate interest in conducting orderly and legitimate elections and protecting against fraud when requiring a pre-registration deadline. 72 Further, the legislature effectuated this goal by setting the deadline twenty days before the election.73
Analysis
III. The SJC Should Not Have Applied Rational Basis Review to the Twenty-Day Voter Registration Deadline
The superior court correctly concluded that the Voter Cutoff Law required review under the necessity test or, alternatively, strict scrutiny.74 As stated in Kineen, which established the necessity test, “[W]hile it is held to be within the proper limits of legislative power to provide suitable regulations for exercising the right of suffrage in a prompt, orderly, and convenient manner,” such a regulation would be an improper exercise of legislative power if it, “under the preten[s]e and color of regulating, should subvert or injuriously restrain the right itself.”75
A. The SJC Should Have Reviewed the Voter Cutoff Law Under the “Necessity” Standard
The SJC first faced a voter registration challenge in 1832.76 In Capen v. Foster, the SJC held that the legislature could require voters to register before casting their ballots.77 However, the deadline to register in Capen was up to and including election day.78 In 1887, the SJC first promulgated the test for determining the constitutionality of statutory voter registration periods.79 In Kineen, an otherwise constitutionally-qualified voter was barred from voting because a statute prohibited naturalized citizens from registering to vote within thirty days of their naturalization.80 The SJC determined the statute was unconstitutional after assessing whether the law was “necessary.”81 Thus, the SJC established the “necessity” standard in Kineen to apply to voter registration statutes. 82 The Court held that any legislation which “postpone[s]” or “diminishes” the right to vote “must be unconstitutional, unless it can be defended on the ground that it is reasonable and necessary.”83 Thus, a voter registration statute will be upheld if a court finds the legislature had a necessary reason for enacting the statute.84 Although the SJC recognized a system of registration as reasonable, the Court emphasized:
No system would be just that did not extend the time of registration up to a time as near that of actually depositing the votes as would be consistent with the necessary preparation for conducting the election in an orderly manner and with a reasonable scrutiny of the correctness of the list.85
The SJC struck down the statute because it attempted to establish another qualification in addition to the qualifications outlined by the Constitution.86 An attempt by the legislature to change or add qualifications of voters should be deemed unconstitutional and void.87
In applying the necessity standard in Chelsea Collaborative v. Galvin, the Massachusetts Superior Court rejected the assertion by the Secretary that the deadline was not a new qualification.88 The superior court came up with five reasons why the twenty-day deadline was not necessary and thus, unconstitutional. 89 First, in 2014, the legislature enacted an early voting statute, which allows a registered voter to vote eleven days before election day.90 Therefore, the superior court determined the process that is required for early voting renders the blackout period unnecessary to process voter registrations, create accurate voting lists, and conduct orderly elections.91 Next, the superior court determined the twenty-day deadline for registration is not necessary to process voter registrations for election day voting, because there are some “post-deadline registrations that are processed without difficulty.”92 Also, the legislature has not reevaluated the burden of the twenty-day deadline in twenty years, despite technological and other procedural changes.93 In addition, sixteen other states allow election day registration.94 Finally, necessity is not established because of the Secretary’s argument that election officials are very busy during election season.95
The Voter Cutoff Law prohibits individuals from voting unless they registered at least twenty days prior to election day.96 The SJC recognized the technological changes that allow for election day registration.97 Other states have implemented election day registrations, including Connecticut, Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia.98 The cost of same day registration varies from each state, but some states indicate there is little to no additional cost to providing same day registration.99 Also, some of the additional costs merely result from purchasing additional equipment, updating existing voter registration systems, or increasing election staff or poll workers.100 Although Massachusetts considered a proposal for same day registration four years ago and failed to make it into a final bill, Massachusetts has made two election law changes that require additional costs. 101 Massachusetts has already expended more than $1 million to provide early voting in the 2016 election. 102 Massachusetts began preparations for automatic voter registration, which will “automatically register eligible voters when they interact with the Registry of Motor Vehicles and MassHealth.”103 Secretary of State William Galvin “expects to have the necessary systems in place on Jan. 1, 2020, ‘just in time for the next Presidential Primaries.’” 104 Thus, Massachusetts has the necessary capabilities to provide its citizens with election day registration and the twenty-day deadline is not necessary to conduct orderly elections.
B. Alternatively, the Voter Cutoff Law Required Strict Scrutiny
Even if the Court found the “necessity” standard did not apply, strict scrutiny was the correct alternative.105 Voting is a fundamental right under the Massachusetts Constitution; as long as a voter meets the basic qualifications outlined in Article 3 of the Amendments, he or she has a right to vote. 106 As stated in Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, “voting has long been recognized as a fundamental political right and indeed the ‘preservative of all rights.’” 107 When there is a fundamental right protected by the Massachusetts Constitution, “a statute that significantly interferes with that right is subject to strict scrutiny.”108 Strict scrutiny requires the Commonwealth to prove a compelling state interest that could not be achieved in a less restrictive manner.109 The SJC applied strict scrutiny to a voter registration challenge in Cepulonis v. Secretary of the Commonwealth. 110 In Cepulonis, two prisoners that were incarcerated in Massachusetts were prohibited from registering to vote by absentee ballot in state elections.111 Prisoners who failed to vote prior to incarceration were prohibited from registering to vote while incarcerated because the Commonwealth’s statute required voter registration for an absentee ballot to be made by affidavit in person.112 The Court in Cepulonis explained that statutory limits on a citizen’s right to vote are permissible only to the extent they survive strict scrutiny.113 In applying strict scrutiny, the Court concluded that it was possible to have a registration process for absentee ballots which protects against fraud and, thus, there was no basis to disenfranchise prisoners and provide no procedure to register to vote.114
Applying strict scrutiny to the Voter Cutoff Law, the Commonwealth’s assertion that the State has a compelling interest in protecting against voter fraud and conducting orderly elections does not outweigh the burden the twenty-day deadline imposes on otherwise qualified voters.115 First, in the 2016 election, there were only four documented cases of voter fraud throughout the country.116 The four documented cases did not include voter registration fraud, wherein an individual registered under a false name or registered twice, but rather individuals who cast two ballots or who cast a ballot on behalf of a deceased relative.117 One of the most common sources of voter fraud stems from clerical errors, such as errors in the poll books or registration records. 118 Also, the Commonwealth’s assertion that the statutory scheme of voter registration deadline ensures orderly elections is diminished by the fact that Massachusetts recently enacted two substantial election laws: one law that allows individuals to vote eleven days prior to election day and another law that allows individuals to register at the Registry of Motor Vehicles or when they apply for MassHealth. 119 The superior court determined that “118,440 people . . . were deterred from registering for the 2014 federal election on account of the voter cutoff law.”120 On the other hand, in the November 2016 general election, Connecticut had 34,929 voters that registered on election day.121 Therefore, even if the SJC concluded the necessity test did not apply to the twenty-day deadline, strict scrutiny rather than rational basis review was the correct standard because the statute disenfranchises qualified voters and prevents them from exercising a fundamental right.122
IV. The Registration Deadline Disenfranchises Potential Voters
As a result of the Court’s reasoning and application of rational basis review, qualified Massachusetts citizens will be discouraged from voting in future elections. As of August 2018, there are 2,474,535 unenrolled voters in Massachusetts.123 In 2014, 19.9% of qualified voters who did not vote blamed the registration deadline, compared to 9.9% nationally. 124 In the 2018 midterm elections, studies showed that voters’ interest peaked during the twenty-day period. 125 Further, the twenty-day blackout period disproportionately affects minorities and underprivileged individuals.126 To these individuals, the registration process is not “simple and accessible.”127 Many cannot afford to take a day off from work to vote on election day, let alone register before the twenty-day period. 128 The locations that are available for in-person registration have business hours typical to an individual’s working hours.129 For example, the Boston Registry of Motor Vehicles is open from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. Monday through Friday and the Springfield Election Office is open from 8:30 a.m. to 4 p.m. Monday through Friday.130 Many underprivileged individuals do not own a home computer or otherwise have access to the internet to register online.131 Also, studies show that people of color, young people, and lower-income people move more often, which results in these individuals not being properly registered to vote.132 Again, election day registration would eliminate these limitations for many of the thousand individuals that have been refused the right to vote.133
Conclusion
In Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court erred in deciding that rational basis review applied to the twenty-day voter registration deadline. The SJC’s decision ignored important precedent and was made contrary to social justice considerations. It is undeniable that voting is a fundamental right protected by the Massachusetts Constitution. In Kineen, the SJC declared a necessity test is required when determining the constitutionality of a voter registration statute. Alternatively, in Cepulonis, the SJC concluded that strict scrutiny was to be applied to a statutory scheme that impaired a prisoner’s right to vote. Thus, when thousands of individuals are disenfranchised because of a statute’s imposition of an arbitrary deadline, strict scrutiny must be applied. The State’s interest does not survive the necessity test or strict scrutiny. There is no clear evidence that the registration deadline guards against voter fraud or ensures orderly elections. However, the deadline disenfranchises thousands of individuals that are otherwise constitutionally qualified voters because they face obstacles in registering to vote before the deadline.
*✕ J.D., New England Law | Boston (2020); B.A., Quinnipiac University, 2016. Thank you to my parents and brother for always supporting and encouraging me through life and to the New England Law Review Editors and Associates for reading and editing my article countless times. Lastly, to my boss and law school friends, thank you for always lending an ear while I worked on this article.
1✕ Derek T. Muller, What’s Old Is New Again: The Nineteenth Century Voter Registration Debates and Lessons About Voter Identification Disputes, 56 Washburn L.J. 109, 109–10 (2017).
2✕ Danielle Root & Liz Kennedy, Increasing Voter Participation in America, Ctr. For Am. Progress (July 11, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://perma.cc/3JVB-BR2B.
3✕ See generally Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 27 (2018) (holding that the twenty-day blackout period for voter registration prior to an election is constitutional).
4✕ Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 51, §§ 1F, 26, 34 (2020).
5✕ Andrea M. Lee, Note, Don’t Save the Date: How More Restrictive State Voter Registration Deadlines Disenfranchise Minority Movers, 43 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 245, 245 (2010).
6✕ Rachel Gillett & Grace Panetta, In New York, California, Texas, and 27 Other States You Can Take Time off from Work to Vote –– Here’s the Full List, Bus. Insider (Nov. 6, 2018, 2:17 PM), https://perma.cc/J7XN-DLTM.
7✕ National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501(b)(1)–(2), 20507(a)(1) (2020).
8✕ Lee, supra note 5, at 247.
9✕ Lee, supra note 5, at 247.
10✕ See Lee, supra note 5, at 272–74.
11✕ Mass. Const. art. IX; Mass. Const. Amends. art. III.
12✕ See Dane v. Board of Registrars of Voters of Concord, 374 Mass. 152, 160 (1978) (noting the right to vote is protected under article I of the Declaration of Rights); Swift v. Board of Registrars of Voters, 281 Mass. 271, 276 (1932) (“The right to vote is a precious personal prerogative to be sedulously guarded” under “[a]rts. 4, 7, 8, [and] 9 of the Declaration of Rights.”); Att’y Gen. v. Suffolk County Apportionment Comm’rs, 224 Mass. 598, 601 (1916) (“The right to vote is a fundamental personal and political right” protected under arts. I through IX of the Bill of Rights.).
13✕ Suffolk County Apportionment Comm’rs, 224 Mass. at 601; See Mass. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 375 Mass. 85, 93–94 (1978).
14✕ See Cepulonis v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 389 Mass. 930, 935 (1983); See also Doe No. 1 v. Sec’y of Educ., 479 Mass. 375, 391 (2018) (holding the right to education is a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny, but it does not include the right to attend charter school).
15✕ Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 27, 34 (2018).
16✕ Alexander Keyssar, The Right To Vote 123 (2009).
17✕ See generally Boston Election Department, Guidelines for Conducting a Voter Registration Drive, Boston.Gov, https://perma.cc/KAZ4-L6RZ (last visited Jan.
19✕, 2021).
18✕ Muller, supra note 1, at 112.
19✕ See Voter Registration Deadlines, Vote.Org, https://perma.cc/J2BP-RXQE (last visited Jan. 23, 2021).
20✕ Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 51, § 26 (2020).
21✕ Id. § 34.
22✕ Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 27, 29 (2018).
23✕ Id.
24✕ Id. at 30.
25✕ Id.
26✕ 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(1) (2020).
27✕ Chelsea Collaborative, Inc., 480 Mass. at 29; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 51, § 26 (2020).
28✕ See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 54, § 25B (2020).
29✕ Haley Glatter, Massachusetts House of Representatives Passes Automatic Voter Registration Bill, Bos. Mag. (June 28, 2018, 11:13 AM), https://perma.cc/KR7V-YJ6W.
30✕ Muller, supra note 1, at 112.
31✕ See Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497, 502 (1887).
32✕ Id. at 500 (“It is not an unreasonable provision that all persons entitled as voters shall be registered as such previously to depositing their ballots . . . .”).
33✕ Id. at 503.
34✕ Id. at 499.
35✕ Cepulonis v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 389 Mass. 930, 931 (1983).
36✕ Id 37 Id. at 932.
38✕ Id. at 937.
39✕ See Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 27, 31 & n.13 (2018); Chelsea Collaborative v. Galvin, No. SUCV20163354D, 2017 WL 4125039, at 1 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 25, 2017).
40✕ Galvin, 2017 WL 4125039 at 1.
41✕ Chelsea Collaborative, Inc., 480 Mass. at 31.
42✕ Id.
43✕ See Galvin, 2017 WL 4125039 at 1.
44✕ Id.
45✕ Chelsea Collaborative, Inc., 480 Mass. at 31.
46✕ Id. at 32.
47✕ Id. at 36. 48 Id. at 37.
49✕ See Id.
50✕ Id.
51✕ See Chelsea Collaborative, Inc., 480 Mass. at 39.
52✕ Id.
53✕ Id.
54✕ Id.
55✕ Id.
56✕ Id. at 37–38.
57✕ Chelsea Collaborative, Inc., 480 Mass. at 40.
58✕ Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Wilbur W., 479 Mass. 397, 403 (2018)).
59✕ Id.
60✕ Id.
61✕ Id. at 41.
62✕ Id.
63✕ Chelsea Collaborative, Inc., 480 Mass. at 41–42.
64✕ Id. at 40.
65✕ Id. at 42.
66✕ See Id. at 43.
67✕ Id. at 43–44.
68✕ See Id. at 44–45.
69✕ See Chelsea Collaborative, Inc., 480 Mass. at 45–46.
70✕ See Id. at 28.
71✕ Id. at 40.
72✕ Id. at 41–42.
73✕ Id.
74✕ See generally Chelsea Collaborative v. Galvin, No. SUCV20163354D, 2017 WL 4125039 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 25, 2017) (holding the twenty-day deadline unconstitutional because it does not survive strict scrutiny and is not necessary).
75✕ Kineen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497, 500–501 (1887) (quoting Capen v. Foster, 29 Mass. 485, 489 (1832)).
76✕ See generally Capen, 29 Mass. 485 (determining the constitutionality of the defendant’s refusal to allow the plaintiff to vote when the plaintiff’s name was not on the list of qualified voters).
77✕ Id. at 497–98.
78✕ Id. at 499–500.
79✕ See Kineen, 144 Mass. at 499.
80✕ Id. at 497.
81✕ Id. at 499.
82✕ Id. 83 Id.
84✕ See Id.
85✕ Kineen, 144 Mass. at 502.
86✕ See Id. at 503.
87✕ Id. at 504.
88✕ Chelsea Collaborative v. Galvin, No. SUCV20163354D, 2017 WL 4125039, at 26 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 25, 2017) (determining whether the regulation that constituted a new qualification was immaterial).
89✕ Id. at 27–28.
90✕ State Laws Governing Early Voting, Nat’l Conf. Of St. Legs. 6 (Oct. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/VVJ8-R2EQ; See also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 54, § 25B (2020).
91✕ Galvin, 2017 WL 4125039 at 27.
92✕ Id.
93✕ Id.
94✕ Id.
95✕ Id.
96✕ See, e.g., Christian M. Wade, Court Upholds 20-Day Cutoff for Voter Registration, Salem News (Jul. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/FR82-886Y.
97✕ Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 27, 37 (2018).
98✕ Same Day Voter Registration, Nat’l Conf. Of St. Legs. 7 (Oct. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/76X7-LF42.
99✕ Id.
100✕ Id.
101✕ Wade, supra note 96.
102✕ See Auditor Bump Certifies More Than $1 Million in Unfunded Mandated Early Voting Costs on Municipalities for 2016 Election, Mass.Gov (Jan. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/D944-XWS4.
103✕ Katie Lannan, Automatic Voter Registration in Mass. to Begin by 2020, Galvin Says, Wbur News (Aug. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/H2W7-UDZD.
104✕ Id.
105✕ See Cepulonis v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 389 Mass. 930, 935 (1983) (“Recognizing that, when it defends the constitutionality of a statute impinging on fundamental rights, the State must demonstrate affirmatively that the challenged provision promotes a compelling State interest which could not be achieved in any less restrictive manner . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted).
106✕ Mass. Const. Amends. art. III.
107✕ Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 27, 32 (2018) (quoting Mass. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 375 Mass. 85, 94 (1978)).
108✕ Id. at 33.
109✕ Cepulonis, 389 Mass. at 935.
110✕ See generally Id. (determining that the Commonwealth was abridging the prisoners’ right to vote and strict scrutiny was the correct standard of review).
111✕ Id. at 931–32.
112✕ Id. at 934.
113✕ Id. at 935–36.
114✕ Id. at 937.
115✕ But See Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 27, 42–43 (2018).
116✕ Philip Bump, There Have Been Just Four Documented Cases of Voter Fraud in the 2016 Election, Wash. Post. (Dec. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/V4UU-CTRS.
117✕ Id.
118✕ Justin Levitt, The Truth About Voter Fraud, Brennan Ctr. For Just. 7 (Nov. 9, 2007), https://perma.cc/W9ZC-PSG6.
119✕ See Wade, supra note 96.
120✕ Chelsea Collaborative v. Galvin, No. SUCV20163354D, 2017 WL 4125039, at 16 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 25, 2017).
121✕ VRM in the States: Connecticut, Brennan Ctr. For Just. (June 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/H9N6-H2CN.
122✕ See generally Galvin, 2017 WL 4125039 (holding the twenty-day deadline is unconstitutional when reviewed under strict scrutiny).
123✕ Massachusetts Registered Voter Enrollment: 1948-2019, Sec’y Of The Commonwealth Of Mass., https://perma.cc/8AQ4-SYQY (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
124✕ Galvin, 2017 WL 4125039 at 17.
125✕ See Philip Bump, People Are Searching for Voter Registration Info at Presidential-Year Levels, Wash. Post (Oct. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/HQ5A-BQEJ.
126✕ See Statement of Stacey Y. Abrams, Founder & Chair, Fair Fight Action, On Continuing Challenges to the Voting Rights Act Since Shelby County v. Holder: Hearing Before the House Judiciary’s Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (June 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/S3GA-PCXF.
127✕ Contra Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 27, 38 (2018).
128✕ See Kenneth Quinnell, Know Your Rights: State Laws on Employee Time off to Vote, Afl-Cio (Nov. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/GC6X-L8V7 (indicating Massachusetts does not require paid time off to vote in an election).
129✕ See Voter Registration in Massachusetts, DMV.ORG, https://perma.cc/RMS4-LRUA (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
130✕ See Id.; Election Office, Springfield-Ma.Gov, https://perma.cc/MB64-AYE9 (last updated Dec. 31, 2020, 1:11 PM).
131✕ See generally Monica Anderson & Madhumitha Kumar, Digital Divide Persists Even as Lower-Income Americans Make Gains in Tech Adoption, Pew Res. Ctr. (May 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/HX5E-FX2E.
132✕ What Is Same Day Registration? Where Is It Available?, Demos (Mar. 18, 2014), https://perma.cc/7NPV-AMVT.
133✕ See Id.